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Performance Motivation: Tests of An Integrated Model 
Performance is usually defined as the level of 
achievement on some dimension during some period of time 
(Vroom, 1964, p.196). Even the most casual observer would 
agree that different individuals (or the same individual at 
different times) engaged in the same task, with the same 
ability, and facing the same environmental constraints, 
often exert varying amounts of effort. To the extent that 
performance is a function of effort, it follows that they 
also perform at different levels. When asked to explain 
these differences in performance, both practitioners and 
academicians are likely to attribute the differences in 
performance to differences in motivation. 
While motivation is often used to explain variance in 
performance, there is little agreement on precisely how such 
a construct should be defined or measured. steers and 
Porter (1983) summarize four prominent researchers' 
definition of motivation: 
Atkinson (1964): the contemporary (immediate) 
influences on the direction, vigor, and 
persistence of action. 
Jones (1955): how behavior gets started, is 
energized, is sustained, is directed, is stopped, 
and what kind of subjective reaction is present in 
the organism while all this is going on. 
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Vroom (1964): a process governing choices made by 
persons or lower orgenisms among alternative forms 
of voluntary activity. 
Campbell & Pritchard (1976): a set of 
independent/dependent variable relationships that 
explain the direction, amplitude, and persistence 
of an individual's behavior, holding constant the 
effects of aptitude, skill, and understanding of 
the task, and the constraints operating in the 
environment. 
Cognitive motivation theories, such as goal setting or 
expectancy theory, hypothesize that the direction, 
amplitude, and persistence of behavior is influenced by 
unobservable mental constructs and processes. Within a 
cognitive framework Campbell and Pritchard's definition can 
be clarified by specifying that the domain of motivation 
theories is the study of the relationship between 
unobservable emotional and cognitive constructs and the 
direction, amplitude, and persistence of behavior while 
holding other factors (such as ability and environmental 
constraints) constant. 
Also, because an individual's emotions and mental 
processes are influenced by environmental stimuli, 
motivation may also be studied as a dependent variable. In 
such a case the focus is on identifying the variables which 
influence those emotional and cognitive constructs related 
to the direction, amplitude, and persistence of behavior. 
2 
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Existing Cognitive Motivation Theories 
For the last 20 years goal setting theory and 
expectancy theories have been two of the most prominent 
cognitive theories of motivation. 
Goal setting 
A goal is what an individual is trying to accomplish. 
3 
It is the object or aim of an action. The term goal refers 
to attaining a specific standard of proficiency on a task, 
usually within a specified time limit (Locke, Saari, Shaw, & 
Latham, 1981). Because the definition of goals is the same 
as Vroom's (1964, p. 196) definition of performance, the 
terms "performance level" and "goal level" are synonymous. 
Other synonyms include the terms "performance standard," 
"quota," "work norm," "task," "objective," "deadline," and 
"budget" (Locke et al., 1981, p. 126). As the diversity of 
terms indicates, goals have important implications for 
fields as different as strategic management (Richards, 
1986), cost accounting (Horngren, 1982), and sports (Locke & 
Latham, 1985). 
The goal construct has a historical research stream 
which begins with the work of Lewin and his associates on 
the determinants of the level of aspiration {Miner, 1980, 
p.169), the work of Drucker, McGregor, Odiorne, and others 
on management by objectives (Miner, 1980, p. 169), and even 
back to Fredrick Taylor, the father of scientific management 
(Locke, 1978). 
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4 
Much of the recent interest in goals began in the 
1960's as a result of the investigation of the effects of 
goal setting by Locke (primarily lab experiments) and Latham 
(primarily field experiments). These theorists had two 
fundamental hypotheses (Locke et al., 1981) 
1. specific goals lead to higher performance than 
"do your best" goals, or no goals; and 
2. difficult goals lead to higher performance than 
easy goals. 
The goals ref erred to in these hypotheses are an 
individual's goals, but the tests of the theory usually 
investigated the relationship between assigned goals and 
performance. Experimenters assigned goals by telling 
subjects that their goal was to achieve a certain level of 
performance within a given time period. 
Although Austin and Bobko (1985) criticized goal 
setting theory for being narrowly focused and failing to 
consider areas such as goal conflict (i.e. quantity goals 
vs. quality goals), conflicts in goal-setting processes, 
individual versus group levels of analysis, and laboratory 
versus field settings most reviewers conclude that there is 
considerable empirical support for the two basic hypotheses 
(for reviews of empirical studies see Austin & Bobko, 1985; 
Campbell, 1982; Latham, 1984; Latham & Yukl, 1975; Locke, 
1968; Locke, et al., 1981; Steers & Porter, 1974; and Tubbs, 
1986). 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5 
Locke et al. (1981) concluded that the effect of goals 
on performance is one of the most robust and replicable 
findings in the psychological literature. Another author 
(Pinder, 1977, p. 169) commented that goal setting theory 
has demonstrated more scientific validity than any other 
theory of work motivation. Chidester and Grigsby (1984) 
state, "Unequivocally, setting either difficult or specific 
goals reliably results in increased productivity." In 
summary, this theory uses assigned goals to explain 
motivational differences in performance. To apply this 
theory one would assign difficult, specific goals--
presumably the more difficult and more specific, the better. 
Expectancy Theories 
The other major cognitive motivation theory used by 
practitioners and academicians over the last fifty years is 
expectancy theory. Expectancy theory has been called, "the 
dominant paradigm for research on work-related motivation" 
(Connolly, 1976) , and, "the most widely accepted theory of 
work and motivation among today's organizational 
psychologists" (Wahba, & House, 1974). The term "expectancy 
theory" does not refer to a specific theory, but to a body 
of related theories which hypothesize that people engage in 
a particular behavior because they choose to, and that their 
choices are based on "expectations" about the consequences 
of their action~. Individuals engage in behaviors which 
they believe will result in pleasure, and avoid behaviors 
they believe will result in pain (Lawler, 1973). 
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While most expectancy theories share these 
assumptions, there are at least two major conceptualizations 
of the way these expectations affect the direction, 
intensity, and persistence of behavior: expectancy theory 
choice models and expectancy theory force models. 
Expectancy theory choice models. These models proposes 
that motivation is the result of an internal decision making 
process (House, Shapiro, & Wahba, 1974). While expectancy 
theory concepts can be found in the work of Lewin (1935) and 
Tolman (1932), and Georgopoulos, Mahoney, and Jones (1957), 
the first major appearance in organizational psychology was 
Vroom's 1964 book Work and Motivation. 
Vroom's version of expectancy theory has two 
fundamental assumptions. The first assumption is that 
individuals have beliefs about the outcomes (consequences) 
which result from their behavior, and the causal 
relationship among these outcomes (Vroom, pp. 17-18). These 
beliefs are referred to as either expectancies or 
instrumentalities, and are similar to Kelly's (1973) notion 
of people as "naive scientists". 
The second hypothesis is that individuals have 
affective reactions to outcomes. Affective reactions 
reflect the attractiveness, anticipated satisfaction, or, in 
Vroom's terminology, the valence of outcomes (Vroom, 1964, 
pp. 15-17). While there is still uncertainty as to the 
determinants of these valences, one of the major 
determinants is believed to be the pleasure or pain outcomes 
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provide (Vroom, 1964; Lawler, 1973). The term valence can 
be considered the equivalent of the term utility as used by 
subjective utility theorist such as Edwards (1955) and 
Savage (1954) (Sussmann & Vecchio, 1985). 
7 
When faced with a choice between alternative behaviors, 
the individual will choose the behavior which he/she 
anticipate will provide the most pleasure or avoid the most 
pain. This evaluation and decision making process is often 
referred to as "hedonistic calculus" (Lawler, 1973). Vroom 
discusses a variety of choices such as occupational choice, 
and choice among performance or effort levels. In terms of 
performance motivation, the theory predicts that individuals 
faced with a choice between high and low effort will pick 
the effort level with the highest expected value. If they 
believe high effort to have a higher expected value than low 
effort they will choose to exert a high level of effort, and 
will be considered to be "highly motivated." If the 
expected value of low effort is greater than the expected 
value of high effort, they will choose to exert a low level 
of effort, and will be considered "unmotivated." In 
summary, this model uses expected values to predict an 
individual's choice of a personal goal level, then uses 
differences in personal goal level to explain motivational 
differences in performance. 
To apply this theory one would attempt to make high 
performance more rewarding than low performance. 
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Expectancy theory motivational force model. Although a 
major focus of Vroom's model is predicting behavior on the 
basis of within subject choices, early tests of the theory 
did not use a within subjects choice to predict behavior, 
but, instead, used between subject differences in the 
attractiveness of a single alternative (such as high 
performance) to predict behavior (see Schwab, Olian-Gottleib 
& Heneman, 1979 for a review of this literature). These 
models have been referred to as single force models 
(Kennedy, Fossum, & White, 1983). The hypothesis was that 
the greater the motivational force toward high performance, 
the more highly motivated the individual would be toward 
high performance, the more effort they would exert, and the 
higher their performance would be. The motivational force 
toward high performance was a funtion of the expected value 
of high performance. In summary, this theory uses 
motivational force to explain motivational differences in 
performance. To apply this theory one would increase 
motivation by increasing the magnitude of the expected value 
of high performance. 
Problems with Existing Theories 
Using any one of the existing theories alone to explain 
as complex a phenomenon as motivation, has inherent 
problems. Any one of the theories makes predictions which 
are inconsistent with both common sense and empirical 
reality. 
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9 
Problems With the Goal Setting Model 
The first problem with the goal setting model is the 
hypothesized linear relationship between goal difficulty and 
performance (Mento, Cartledge, & Locke, 1980; Locke et al., 
1986). This implies that assigning increasingly difficult 
goals results in increasingly higher levels of performance. 
Based on goal setting theory alone, one would conclude that 
the only action necessary to solve motivation problems is to 
assign difficult, specific goals--presumably the more 
difficult and the more specific the better. As a matter of 
fact, some researchers have taken the position that it may 
be better to assign unattainable goals (Garland, 1982, 
1983). While there is some empirical evidence which 
supports this position (Garland, 1982, 1983; Locke, 1982) 
there are also a number of studies which did not obtain a 
simple linear relationship between assigned goals and 
performance (Atkinson & Feather, 1966; Ivancevich and 
McMahon 1977; Latham & Saari, 1979; Motowidlo, Loehar, & 
Dunnette, 1978; Steers & Porter 1974). 
Goal setting alone is unable to explain why an 
individual will choose one goal over another, or why 
individuals with the same goal will vary in the amount of 
effort they exert. As a result, a number of different 
reviewers (Latham & Yukl, 1975; Campbell, 1982; Campion & 
Lord, 1982; Chacko & McElroy, 1983; Naylor & Ilgen, 1984; 
Steers & Porter, 1974) have reached the conclusion that goal 
setting alone is an inadequate theory of motivation. 
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At one point even Locke (1975) believed that goal 
setting was not a theory, but a motivation technique (for a 
dissenting view see Miner,1980). 
Problems With the Expectancy Choice Model 
An expectancy choice model, on the other hand, would 
indicate that the only condition necessary for motivation is 
that high performance be perceived as having a higher 
expected value than low performance. This means that an 
individual would be equally motivated if the difference 
between high and low performance was one dollar or a million 
dollars. This theory (like goal setting theory) is 
incapable of explaining why individuals with the same goal 
may exert varying amounts of effort. 
Problems With the Expectancy Force Model 
An expectancy force model does explain why individuals 
with the same goal may exert differing amounts of effort. 
The difference would be due to differences in motivational 
force. However, it cannot explain goal choice. This theory 
would predict that an individual would exert more effort if 
the expected value of high performance was one million 
dollars than he/she would if the expected value was one 
dollar. However, it ignores the possibility that the 
expected value of low performance may be higher than the 
expected value of high performance and, therefore, the 
individual has a low pe~formance goal and exerts little 
effort--no matter what the magnitude of the expected value 
of high performance is. 
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A motivation theory should be capable of explaining 
both the direction and intensity of behavior. With respect 
to goals, the theory should be able to explain goal choice 
(direction) and the effort exerted toward a goal 
(intensity). Any one of the theories alone is incapable of 
explaining both direction and intensity. 
Solvinq the Problems with Existinq Theories 
Two approaches have been used to solve the problems 
with existing theories, 1) the theories have been viewed as 
complementary and two or more of the theories integrated 
(and the strengths of one theory used to offset the weakness 
of another theory), or 2) the theories have been viewed as 
contradictory (one of the theories is right and the others 
are wrong) and additional constructs have been added to one 
of the theories. 
Theories as complementary 
Because the goal setting theory's major weakness is its 
inability to explain goal choice (Latham & Yukl, 1975), and 
since the expectancy theory choice model is formulated as an 
i~ternal decision making model (House et al., 1974), 
theorists have argued that expectancy theory is a logical 
complement to goal setting theory (Campbell, Dunnette, 
Lawler, & Weick, 1970; Daehler & Mobley, 1973; Erez, Earley, 
& Hulin, 1985; Erez & Kanfer, 1983; Evans, 1986; Garland, 
1985; Latham & Yukl, 1975; Locke, 1968; Locke, Lee, & Bobko, 
1984; Locke, Motowidlo, & Bobko, 1986; Motowidlo, et al., 
1978; Naylor & Ilgen, 1984; and Steers & Porter, 1974;). 
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Theories as Contradictory 
It has also been argued that goal setting and 
expectancy force theories are contradictory (Mento et al., 
1980; Motowidlio et al., 1978). Reviewers have criticized 
the expectancy motivational force model as an unacceptable 
operationalization of expectancy theory (Conolly, 1976; 
Heneman & Schwab, 1971; House & Wahba, 1972; Mitchell, 1974; 
Mitchell, 1979; Mitchell, 1982; Mitchell & Biglan, 1971; 
Wahba & House, 1974). 
If the existing theories are contradictory, problems 
with existing theories (such as obtaining a non-linear 
relationship between assigned goals and performance) must be 
overcome by the addition of new constructs. For example, 
goal setting researchers explained the non-linear 
relationship between assigned goals and performance by 
saying that subjects did not accept the goal (introducing a 
new construct-goal acceptance) or were not committed to the 
goal (introducing a new construct-goal commitment). 
The introduction of additional goal constructs 
introduces a new set of problems. Goal setting theory alone 
offers no explanation as to what determines goal acceptance 
or goal commitment (Locke, Latham, & Erez, 1988). If the 
determinants of goal acceptance and goal commitment are not 
clearly specified, predictions about goal acceptance and 
commitment cannot be made, and goal setting theory becomes 
untestable. 
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To quote Latham and Yukl, 
the greatest deficiency of Locke's theory is the 
failure to specify the determinants of goal 
acceptance and goal commitment. (1975, p. 841) 
13 
Consequently, a great deal of recent research has focused on 
the development of two new goal setting theory constructs--
goal acceptance and goal commitment (i.e. Hollenbeck and 
Klein, 1987; Leifer and McGannon, 1986; Locke et al., 1988). 
Justification for Proposed Theory Development 
Before developing new constructs it must first be 
determined whether goal acceptance/goal commitment are 
really new constructs or are simply new names for constructs 
which already exist in other theories. Garland (1982, 1984) 
and Locke, Frederick, Lee, and Bobko (1984) concluded that 
goal setting and expectancy theory are no longer in 
conflict. If the theories are not contradictory, and the 
goal acceptance/goal commitment constructs can be explained 
by integrating existing theories, it would be preferable to 
use existing theories rather than continue the development 
of new constructs. Integrating existing theories is more 
parsimonious, has the advantage of using the body of 
knowledge associated with existing theories, and makes a 
significant theoretical contribution by providing what Landy 
and Becker (1987) have labeled a "middle range" type of 
motivation theory--a more comprehensive theory capable of 
explaining both the direction and the intensity of behavior. 
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Using an integrated theory to specify the determinants 
of goal acceptance and goal commitment clarifies the 
relationship between goals and other motivation constructs 
and theories, improves our understanding of why so may 
conflicting results have appeared when goal setting has 
attempted to address issues such as the role of extrinsic 
rewards and the probability of success, and allows more 
precise predictions about goal acceptance and goal 
commitment than is possible with models such as those 
proposed by Locke et al. (1988) or Hollenbeck and Klein 
(1987). 
To be successful an integrated theory must (1) resolve 
the confusion between goal acceptance and goal commitment, 
(2) resolve the perceived conflict between goal setting and 
expectancy theory, and (3) resolve the perceived conflict 
between the expectancy choice model and the expectancy force 
model. Reconciling these conflicts will assist 
practitioners by explaining why an individual will choose 
one performance goal level but not another, why an 
individual will accept one assigned goal but not another, 
and why individuals with the same goal level may exert 
different amounts of effort. 
These issues are addressed both conceptually and 
empirically. Chapter 2 reviews relevant literature, 
proposes an integrated model, and derives testable 
hypotheses. Chapter 3 describes a laboratory study used to 
test the major hypotheses derived in Chapter 2, Chapter 4 
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presents the results, and Chapter 5 contains the 
conclusions, discussion and implications. 
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Because of the extensive literature which exist for 
both goal setting and expectancy theories, and because the 
focus of this study is on integrated models, only studies 
comparing two or more theories are reviewed in detail. The 
literature review contains a summary of: 1) the goal 
setting, expectancy choice, and expectancy force models, 
2) arguments for and against integration, 3) development of 
the goal acceptance/goal commitment constructs, and 4) a 
description of an integrated theory. The review concludes 
with the hypotheses derived from the integrated theory. 
Goal Setting, Expectancy Choice, and Expectancy Force Models 
The Goal Setting Model 
While Locke has attributed his interest in goal setting 
to Mace (1935) (Locke, 1966a, 1966b) and Ryan (1958) (Locke, 
1968), most recent interest in goal setting is the result of 
the research began by Locke and Bryan in the 1960's (Bryan, 
& Locke, 1967a, 1967b; Locke, 1966a, 1966b, 1967, 1968; 
Locke & Bryan, 1966a, 1966b, 1967a, 1967b, 1968a, 1968b). 
The fundamental premise of these studies is that people have 
goals and intentions which affect what he/she does, and 
goals are the most immediate regulators of performance 
(Locke & Bryan, 1968b). They propose that ~s the difficulty 
of an individual's goal increases, task performance 
increases (Locke, 1968). 
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These propositions were an attempt to refute the 
behavioral, noncognitive, position of some researchers 
(Locke, 1968, Locke 1972, Locke, 1975). Although Locke was 
a cognitive theorist, the proposition that individual goals 
(IG) determine behavior, and subsequently individual 
performance (P), does not apply to all behavior, but only to 
purposive, goal-directed behavior. While arguing that most 
behavior is goal directed, Locke conceded that some behavior 
(such as reflexive behavior) is not goal directed (Locke, 
1968). Therefore, although not recognized as such by Locke, 
the theoretical foundation of goal setting is a tautology. 
Goal-directed, purposive behavior must be related to goals 
or else it would not be goal directed behavior (Locke, 
1969). 
The original goal setting tautology hypothesized a 
relationship between an individual's goal (IG) and 
performance (P) or. behavior, not between assigned goals (AG) 
and behavior. Many of the experiments designed to test the 
theory, however, did not test the relationship between 
individual goals and performance, but, instead, tested the 
relationship between assigned goals and performance (Bryan, 
& Locke, 1967a, 1967b; Locke, 1966a, 1966b, 1967, 1968; 
Locke & Bryan, 1966a, 1966b, 1967a, 1967b, 1968a, 1968b). 
These models assume that IG = AG, and that P = f(AG). 
The hypothesis that assigning difficult, specific goals 
will increase performance has received considerable 
empirical support. The theory has been tested using a 
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variety of laboratory tasks, such as brainstorming (Locke, 
1966a), addition (Locke & Bryan, 1969), psychomotor tasks 
(Locke & Bryan, 1966), driving a car (Locke & Bryan, 1969a), 
figure selection (Bavelas, 1978), and chess (Campbell & 
Ilgen, 1976), as well as a variety of field task such as 
logging, clerical work, typing, computation, training, 
machine servicing, truck loading, ship loading, die casting, 
supervision, safety behavior, scientific and engineering 
work, key punching, technical work, customer service, 
assembly, telephone service work, writing, and various 
management tasks (Locke et al., 1985). 
Locke et al. (1981), conclude that in 99 of 110 goal 
setting studies specific, hard goals led to higher 
performance than medium, easy, do-your-best, or no goals. 
Latham & Lee (1985) report that in 64 of 66 field studies 
specific, challenging goals resulted in higher performance 
than nonspecific goals, and that laboratory studies and 
field studies produce similar results--lending credibility 
to the use of laboratory studies in this particular area of 
research. Chidester and Grigsby (1984) concluded that, 
"Unequivocally, setting either difficult or specific goals 
reliably results in increased productivity." 
The strong empirical support seems to have lead to the 
implicit assumption that assigning goals will always improve 
performance. The problem with such a conclusion is that one 
is lead to believe that the only action necessary to solve 
motivation problems is to assign difficult, specific goals. 
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Even worse, one could conclude that the more difficult the 
assigned goals the better--even to the point of suggesting, 
as some authors have (Garland, 1982; Garland, 1983; Locke, 
1982) that it may be better to assign unattainable goals! 
The Expectancy Theory Choice Model 
The expectancy theory choice model's basic proposition 
is that motivation is the result of choices individuals make 
among alternative effort or performance levels. If an 
individual chooses to exert high effort over low effort, 
he/she is more highly motivated. Expectancy theory has also 
received a number of positive reviews. It has, for example, 
been called "the dominant paradigm for research on work-
related motivation (Connolly, 1976)," and, "the most widely 
accepted theory of work and motivation among today's 
organizational psychologists" (Wahba, & House, 1974). For 
more extensive reviews of expectancy theory literature see 
Campbell, & Pritchard, 1976; Connolly, 1976; Heneman & 
Schwab, 1972; House & Wahba, 1972; Lawler, 1973; Mitchell, 
1974; Mitchell, 1979; Mitchell, 1982; Mitchell & Biglan, 
1971; Schwab et al., 1979; Wahba & House, 1974. 
Although constructs and hypothesis similar to those in 
expectancy theory can be found in the work of motivation 
theorist such as Georgopolous, Mahoney, and Jones (1957); 
Lewin (1935); and Tolman (1932), most recent interest in 
expectancy theory stems from Vroom's 1964 book Work and 
Motivation. Vroom assumes that behavior is the result of 
choices among alternative courses of action, and that 
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choices are lawfully related to psychological events 
occurring contemporaneously with the behavior described. It 
is a cognitive model similar to models developed by Atkinson 
(1958); Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel (1957); Lewin (1938); 
Peak (1955); Rotter (1955); and Tolman (1959) (Vroom, 1964, 
p. 14). Vroom•s model has three constructs: valences, 
expectancies, and instrumentalities. 
Valences. Valences are defined as affective 
orientations toward particular outcomes. The term "valence" 
is similar to the terms "incentive" (Atkinson, 1958b), 
"attitude" (Peak, 1955), and "expected utility" (Edwards, 
1954) (Vroom, 1964, p. 15). While distinguishing between 
values and valences on the basis of anticipated satisfaction 
(valence) versus experienced satisfaction (value), Vroom 
discusses valences in much the same way Rokeach (1973) 
discusses values. Some outcomes have value in and of 
themselves (what Rokeach would call terminal values), while 
other outcomes have value only because they lead to other 
desired outcomes (Rokeach's instrumental values). 
While Vroom offers no explanation as to how terminal 
outcomes acquire their valence, the valence of an 
instrumental outcome is a monotonically increasing function 
of the algebraic sum of the products of the valences of all 
other outcomes and the instrumentality of the outcome for 
the attainment of these other outcomes (Vroom, 1964, p. 
17) . 




VJ = fJ [ I: (VkIJk) ] 
k=l 
j = 1. .• n; fJ'>O; iIJJ=O 
vj = the valence of outcome j 
Ijk = the cognized instrumentality of outcome j 
for the attainment of outcome k, and -1 .s, Ijk .s, 1. 
Instrumentalities. Instrumentalities are defined as 
outcome-outcome associations which can range from -1 
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(outcome j is certain without outcome k and impossible with 
it) to +1 (outcome j is a sufficient and necessary condition 
for the attainment of outcome k) (Vroom, 1964, p. 18). 
Vroom (1964, p. 18) states that the valence model is useful 
in understanding preferences, but is not able to predict 
choices. To predict choices a third construct, 
expectancies, is introduced. 
Expectancies. Expectancies are defined as act-outcome 
subjective beliefs or probabilities similar to what Tolman 
(1959), Rotter (1955), Atkinson (1958b) call expectancies 
and what Edwards (1954), Davidson et al. (1957) call 
subjective probabilities (Vroom, 1964, p. 17). These 
expectancies reflect an individuals beliefs about the 
consequents of behavior alternatives. The combination of 
expectancies and valences results in a force model often 
referred to as the "expectancy model." 
The expectancy model, or force model, is a descendant 
of force models such as Tolman's performance vector (1959), 
Atkinson's aroused motivation (1958b), Luce's subjective 
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expected utility (1962), and Rotter's behavior potential 
(1955) (Vroom, 1964, p. 18). The basic proposition is that 
the force on a person to perform an act is a 
monotonically increasing function of the algebraic 
sum of the products of the valences of all 
outcomes and the strength of his expectancies that 
the act will be followed by the attainment of 




Fi = f1 [ ~ (EijVj)] (i = n+l. •. m) 
j=l 
Fi = the force to perform act i. 
E1j = the strength of the expectancy (O~E1j~l) that 
act i will be followed by outcome j. 
Vj =the valence of outcome j. 
People choose from among alternative acts the one with the 
strongest positive (or weakest negative) force (Vroom, 1964, 
p. 19). The only assumption about rationality is that of 
subjective rationality (Vroom, 1964, p. 18). Given a choice 
among effort levels, Vroom's model predicts that an 
individual with the motivation force scores (MFS) in Figure 
1 would choose to work at goal level four. 
Very few studies have used a choice model to predict 
effort. Kennedy et al. (1983) predicted the time spent by 
students on various activities--studies, athletics, social 
activities, spiritual activities, service toward others, and 
leisure. They obtained MFS scores for each of five effort 
levels for each activity, then used the motivational scores 
to predict the effort level the subject would choose. 
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The model predicted that the students would spend more hours 
on each activity than was actually spent. 
In summary, in the expectancy choice model goal is the 
sole determinant of effort, and goal is equal to the point 
where the first derivative of the utility function (the 
slope) is equal to zero--the maximum point of the utility 
curve. Apparently it is assumed that the utility function 
is quadratic, since a linear utility function would predict 
that everyone would have the same goal (see Figure 1). 
The Expectancy Theory Force Model 
Although the discussion thus far has presented 
expectancy theory as a within-subjects decision model, until 
1974 virtually all of the tests used a between-subjects 
design (Mitchell, 1974). In such designs, differences in 
the magnitude of individuals expectancies, valences, or 
motivational force for a single alternative were used to 
explain motivational differences in individuals performance. 
Galbraith and Cummings (1967), for example, tested a model 
which included an intrinsic outcome (ego involvement) as 
well as a variety of extrinsic outcomes (such as being 
popular with coworkers, a pay increase, support and 
consideration of supervisor, promotion, and fringe 
benefits). Effort and performance were assumed to be 
perfectly correlated and expectancies were not measured; the 
instrumentality and valence measures were dummy coded and 
used as predictors of performance (measured as the average 
monthly percentage of standard) . 
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Figure 1 
Effort Utility curve Example 
MFS 
o Linear utility function 
4 + 
0 
3 + + 
0 
2 + + 
0 
1 + + Quadratic utility function 
Goal Level 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
MFS Motivational force score 
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The only significant predictor was an interaction term which 
contained the instrumentality and valence of supervisor 
support and consideration. 
Lawler and Porter (1967) also assume a high correlation 
between effort and performance. While they measured the 
probability that effort would lead to certain outcomes (a 
measure of expectancy) as well as the probability that high 
productivity or high performance would lead to these 
outcomes (a measure of instrumentality) they ended up 
combining them into one index. While valences times 
expectancies predicted better than valences or expectancies 
alone, providing some support for expectancy theory, the 
correlation between instrumentality and effort was only .11 
and the correlation between instrumentality and performance 
was only .18. The proposed interaction between role 
perceptions and motivation was not supported. 
Lawler (1968) did one of the few longitudinal studies 
in expectancy theory research. Two measures, one year 
apart, were obtained for performance and instrumentality-
valence. The cross-lagged correlations indicated that the 
instrumentality-valence effect on performance was stronger 
than the performance effect on instrumentality-valence. 
Hackman and Porter (1968) examined the relationship between 
instrumentality and performance, valence and performance, 
and instrumentality times valence and performance. The 
multiplication of instrumentality and valence yielded higher 
correlations than any of the other possible combinations. 
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Porter and Lawler (1968) used the same measures used by 
Lawler and Porter (1967). Both instrumentalities and role 
perceptions were significant predictors of performance, but 
the interaction terms were not significant. 
Problems with the Goal, Choice, and Force Models 
As was pointed out in Chapter 1, any one of the 
theories alone has inherent weaknesses. Goal setting alone 
is unable to explain why a person chooses one goal but not 
another, and is incapable of explaining why individuals with 
the same goal, the same ability, and the same constraints 
exert different amounts of effort. The expectancy theory 
force model is capable of explaining why individuals with 
the same goal would exert different amounts of effort, but 
is unable to explain goal choice. The expectancy choice 
model is capable of explaining the choice among performance 
goals, but is incapable of explaining why an increase in the 
magnitude of a reward would increase motivation. 
The differences in these models can be illustrated by 
using the example of two individuals (Il and !2) faced with 
a choice of performance goals (see Figure 2). A goal choice 
model predicts that both individuals will choose the same 
goal (medium performance). Because they have the same goal, 
both the goal setting model and the expectancy choice model 
predict that they will exert the same amount of effort 
In the goal setting and expectancy choice models the 
magnitude of the utility is irrelevant. Even though the 
medium goal level has much higher utility for !2 than for 
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the same amount of effort. 
27 
Thus an individual offered $1 for completing a task, 
and nothing if isn't completed, would be just as motivated 
as the person offered $1,000,000 for completing the task and 
nothing if it isn't completed, a theoretical prediction 
vastly at odds with common sense and experience. On the 
other hand, a motivational force model would predict that !2 
would exert more effort than Il even though they both have 
the same goal, because the magnitude of the motivational 
force (expected value) is greater. 
Existing Views of the Relationship Among the Theories 
Opinions about the relationship between expectancy 
theory and goal setting theory range from one extreme, where 
theorist argue that the theories are complementary and 
should be integrated, to the other extreme where the 
theories are believed to be contradictory. One of the 
reasons such different conclusions have been reached is that 
theorist have failed to distinguish beteen expectancy theory 
choice models and expectancy theory force models. If the 
distinction between the choice and force models are 
recognized, it can be seen that those theorist who believe 
the theories to be complementary are talking about the 
expectancy choice model and the goal setting model, while 
those theorist who believe the theories to be contradictory 
are talking about the expectancy force model and the goal 
setting model. 
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Theories as Complementary 
Because the goal setting theory's major weakness is its 
inability to explain goal choice (Latham & Yukl, 1975), and 
because the expectancy theory choice model is formulated as 
an internal decision making model (House et al., 1974), 
theorist have argued that expectancy theory is a logical 
complement to goal setting theory (Campbell, Dunnette et 
al., 1970; Daehler & Mobley, 1973; Erez et al., 1985; Erez 
and Kanfer, 1983; Evans, 1986; Garland, 1985; Latham & Yukl, 
1975; Locke, 1968; Locke et al., 1984; Locke et al., 1986; 
Motowidlo et al., 1978; Naylor & Ilgen, 1984; and Steers & 
Porter, 1974). 
Daehler & Mobley•s model. The earliest attempt to 
integrate expectancy theory and goal setting, was the work 
of Campbell et al. (1970). Task goals were introduced as an 
additional expectancy theory construct, but they did not 
specify the nature of the relationship between expectancies, 
valences, and goals. In 1973, Daehler & Mobley, using the 
earlier theoretical model of Campbell et al. (1970), were 
the first to use formulations similar to Vroom's to predict 
performance goal choice. In their model an individual faced 
with a choice among goal levels is predicted to choose the 
goal level with the highest expected utility (EU). The 
expected utility of a goal is obtained by multiplying the 
expectancy that a.given alternative is attainable (E) times 
the expected value of that alternative (EV). 
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Based on their description, the formula would be: 
EUs = Es X EVs. E is a function of situational restraints 
(SR) and ability (A). The expected value of each 
alternative is the sum of the products obtained by 
multiplying the probability that an outcome will result from 
accomplishing a given goal (E2) times the valence (V) of the 
outcome. Their description would result in the following 
formula (they apparently assumed the valence of a given 
outcome (j) is constant across all levels of G). 
n 
EVs = ~ (E2gj * Vj) 
j=l 
E2 is a function of rewards and punishments (RP) . 
Rewards and punishments (RP) are a function of past 
performance. The goal with the highest expected utility 
then becomes the individual's goal. Effort is a function of 
the individual's goal. Finally, performance (P) is a 
function of effort, ability, and situational restraints. 
The integration of goal setting and expectancy theory 
is achieved by assuming that choice among effort levels 
(hypothesized by Vroom) is the equivalent to a choice among 
performance goal levels, as Figure 3 illustrates. The 
theory predicts that individual One (Il) will choose goal 
level 1, while individual Two (I2) will choose goal level 2. 
As a result of the higher goal, I2 will exert higher effort 
and, assuming ability and no environmental restraints, 
perform at a higher level. 
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Daehler and Mobley's integrated model was tested in two 
different plants. In Plant 1 the correlations between 
predicted goals and actual goals, and between goals and 
performance were significant, but the correlations were 
generally low (.30 or below). In Plant 2 the relationship 
between predicted goals and actual goals were also 
significant (with correlations again around .30), but the 
correlations between goals and performance were generally 
either not significant or very low (.16 or lower). As a 
result, the tests were not conclusive. 
Evan•s model. Evan (1986) has also proposed a model to 
use expectancy theory to predict goal choice where 
Ma .. n are the motivational forces associated with 
goals a .. n; 
IVAa .. n is the anticipated satisfaction associated 
with working at a level so as to achieve goals 
a .. n; 
Eia .. n is the expectancy or perceived probability 
that the individual can attain goal a .. n; 
IVBa .. n is the anticipated satisfaction that the 
individual expects to gain from attaining goals 
a •. n; 
EVj are the anticipated satisfactions associated 
with extrinsic rewards (compensation, promotion, 
time off, etc.); and 
E2aj is the set of probabilities that extrinsic 
reward j will follow as a consequence of achieving 
goal a. 
He argues that when faced with a choice among goals, an 
individual will choose the goal with the highest 
motivational force (M8 ). So far Evan's model has not been 
empirically tested. The causal order assumed by Daehler & 
Mobley (1973) and Evans (1986) is: 
Goal Assignment-->Goal Choice-->Goal-->Effort-->Performance 
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Theories as Contradictory 
The goal setting model vs. the expectancy force model. 
It has also been argued that the theories are mutually 
exclusive, contradictory, explanations of motivation,. which 
means the theories cannot be integrated (Mento et al., 1980; 
and Motowidlo et al., 1978. These authors reach their 
conclusions by comparing the predictions made by the goal 
setting model with predictions derived from the expectancy 
force model. They begin with two propositions. The first 
is that goal setting hypothesizes a positive, linear 
relationship between an individual's goal (GL) and 
performance (PL). The second is that the expectancy force 
theory hypothesizes a positive, linear relationship between 
expected utility (EU) and performance. Valences and 
expectancies are assumed to be independent. They argue that 
because an increase in goal level should decrease the 
probability of success, and expectancy theory multiplies 
valence and the probability of success to calculate 
motivational force, if valences remain constant decreasing 
probabilities of success would result in lower motivation 
and lower performance (Motowidlo et al., 1978). 
The authors conclude that expectancy theory would 
predict a negative linear relationship between goal level 
and performance--the opposite of the prediction made by goal 
setting. 
Even though these researchers do not differentiate 
between the expectancy choice and the expectancy force 
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models, the perceived conflict must be between the goal 
setting model and the expectancy force, or·what some 
researchers (Kennedy et al., 1983), have labeled a single-
alternative expectancy model. The model is an expectancy 
force model because expectancies and valences were measured 
with respect to only one goal--the individual's assigned 
goal. Performance or effort was correlated with either 
expectancy, valence, or expectancy * valence. There is no 
conflict with an expectancy choice model because the 
expectancy choice model makes no predictions about the 
consequences of increasing or decreasing the expected 
utility of any specific act, but only make predictions based 
on the relative attractiveness among acts. 
Atkinson {1957), who explicitly assumes that 
expectancies and valences are not independent, but, instead, 
expectancies determine the degree to which individuals 
experience intrinsic satisfaction from goal achievement, has 
also used an expectancy force model to reach a conclusion 
contradictory to the goal model. Atkinson {1957) theorized, 
and provided empirical support for (Atkinson, 1958a, 1958b), 
a curvilinear relationship between goal level and 
performance. Atkinson's achievement theory assumes that 
when no extrinsic outcomes are present the strength of the 
motivation toward an act is equal to the motivation to 
achieve success (Ms) minus the motivation to avoid failure 
(Mr). Ms is equal to the probability of success (P5 ) times 
the incentive value of success. The incentive value of 
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success is equal to (l-P5 ). Mf is equal to the probability 
of failure (Pf) times the incentive value of failure. The 
incentive value of failure is equal to -(1-Pf). If M5 is 
greater than Mf, and if one assumes that performance is a 
function of the strength of motivation to perform an act, 
then the relationship between goal level and performance 
would be curvilinear with maximum performance occurring when 
the probability of success is .5-a moderately difficult goal 
level. 
Attempts to resolve the conflict empirically (Arvey, 
1972; Motowidlo et al., 1978; Mento et al., 1980) were 
inconclusive with the first two studies interpreted as 
supporting expectancy theory or achievement theory, while 
the results in the third study were interpreted as 
supporting goal setting. 
The expectancy choice model vs the expectancy force 
model. Reviewers have also criticized the expectancy 
motivational force model as an unacceptable 
operationalization of expectancy theory (Connolly, 1976; 
Heneman & Schwab, 1972; House & Wahba, 1972; Mitchell, 1974; 
Mitchell, 1979; Mitchell, 1982; Mitchell & Biglan, 1971; 
Wahba & House, 1974). They view the expectancy force model 
as contradictory to the expectancy choice model because 
tests of the motivational force model have used a between-
subjects design even though, according to these researchers, 
Vroom's model requires a within-subjects design. 
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In addition to its theoretical correctness, at least 
two other reasons have been offered for preferring a within-
subjects test of the theory. First, ·individual differences 
(which could produce theory error in between-subjects test) 
are not relevant in within-subject designs (Kopelman, 1979). 
Second, the lack of ratio level data (which make tests 
between subjects difficult) (Schmidt, 1973) is not a problem 
for within-subject designs because within-subject designs do 
not require ratio level measurement (Ilgen, Nebeker, & 
Pritchard, 1981). 
Addition of the goal acceptance/goal commitment 
constructs. If the existing theories are contradictory, 
problems with existing theories (such as obtaining a non-
linear relationship between assigned goals and performance) 
must be overcome by the addition of new constructs. While 
new constructs have been added to both goal setting and 
expectancy theory (see Miller & Grush, 1988, for an example 
of constructs added to expectancy theory) two constructs 
(goal acceptance and goal commitment) added by goal setting 
researchers are most directly related to the integrated 
theory being developed here, and are the only additional 
constructs considered. 
One explanation offered for the nonlinear relationship 
between assigned goals and performance is that individuals 
do not always accept assigned goals (Erez & Kanfer, 1983), 
or are not committed to the goal (Locke et al., 1981). The 
simple linear relationship between goal difficulty and 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
performance can only be asserted if goal acceptance is 
assumed (Locke et al.., 1981). 
Locke (1968) contains one of the first models which 
attempts to integrate the goal acceptance/goal commitment 
constructs into the goal setting model. In this model: 
Environmental Event -> Cognition -> Evaluation -> Goal 
Setting -> Performance. 
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Goal assignment can be interpreted as an environmental 
event which would trigger cognition, evaluation, and 
ultimately individual goals. While the importance of goal 
acceptance and goal commitment is recognized, no attempt is 
made to identify the specific determinants or processes 
affecting these variables. It is hypothesized that monetary 
rewards and other incentives primarily affect the acceptance 
of assigned goals, but no attempt is made to specify 
precisely how. 
In an article by Locke, Cartledge, and Knerr (1970) the 
1968 model is expanded to: 
Existents -> Cognition -> Affective Reaction -> Goal Setting 
-> Actions 
As the result of evidence presented in the article, the 
evaluation stage is hypothesized to include anticipated 
incentives or outcomes, and the affective stage is expanded 
to include anticipatory emotions and desires (the judged 
instrumentality of anticipated goals). When assigned a goal 
the individual makes a choice to attempt the assigned goal 
level, or some other level. The willingness to accept a 
goal would be a function of the extent to which the expected 
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outcomes of goal achievement are desired outcomes. No 
specific directions are given for predicting goal choice, 
and no empirical test of the goal choice model is provided. 
Erez et al. (1983) hypothesize that goal assignment is 
the initiator of goal choice. They frame the choice as one 
of choosing to accept or not accept the goal, and propose 
that individuals will choose a goal if the expected utility 
of choosing the goal is higher than the expected utility of 
not choosing the goal. They do not specify a precise 
formula for calculating the expected utility of accepting or 
not accepting a ~oal. Participation in goal setting is 
viewed as one strategy for gaining goal acceptance. 
Although Erez, Early, and Hulin (1985) provide empirical 
evidence which supports the participation hypothesis, they 
do not test the hypothesis that goal acceptance can be 
predicted by using the expected utility of goal acceptance 
and goal rejection. 
The introduction of additional goal constructs, such as 
goal acceptance and goal commitment, led to a new set of 
problems. Goal setting theory offers no explanation as to 
what determines goal acceptance or goal commitment (Locke et 
al., 1988). If the determinants of goal acceptance and goal 
commitment are not clearly specified, predictions about goal 
acceptance and commitment cannot be made, and goal setting 
theory becomes untestable. To quote Latham and Yukl (1975) 
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the greatest deficiency of Locke's theory is the 
failure to specify the determinants of goal 
acceptance and goal commitment. (p. 841) 
Consequently, a great deal of recent research has 
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focused on the development of the goal acceptance/goal 
commitment constructs (e.g. Hollenbeck & Klein, 1987; Leifer 
& McGannon, 1986; Locke et al., 1988). Locke et al. (1988) 
recently proposed that goal commitment is the result of 
certain cognitive processes which are influenced by external 
factors (such as authority and external rewards and 
incentives), interactive factors (participation), and 
internal factors (expectancy, self-efficacy, and internal 
rewards). Hollenbeck and Klein (1987) propose that the two 
major determinants of goal commitment are the attractiveness 
of goal attainment and the expectancy of goal attainment, 
and that attractiveness and expectancy are determined by 
various situational and individual variables. While they 
have tested the relationship between some of the individual 
measures and goal commitment (Hollenbeck & Brief, 1987; 
Hollenbeck & Williams, 1987), they have not directly tested 
the relationship between attractiveness or expectancy and 
goal commitment. 
Problems with goal acceptance/goal commitment. There 
are several problems with the existing state of development 
of the goal commitment/goal acceptance constructs. One is 
that none of the theories provide a specific, testable 
hypothesis about how cognitive processes involving 
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variables such as expectations or attractiveness determine 
goal acceptance/goal commitment. Second, none of the models 
have any empirical support for the linkage between 
expectations/attractiveness and goal commitment. 
Also, even though a review of the recent conceptual 
work in goal commitment indicates that the determinants 
being proposed for goal commitment are in fact the same 
variables which have traditionally been used in expectancy 
models, no attempt has been made to compare the goal 
acceptance/goal commitment constructs with constructs or 
processes which already exist in expectancy theory such as 
goal choice or motivational force. Before continuing the 
development of new constructs it is important to question 
critically whether the theories are really in conflict, and 
whether goal acceptance/goal commitment are really new 
constructs or are simply new names for existing constructs. 
If the theories are not contradictory, and the goal 
acceptance/goal commitment constructs can be explained with 
existing expectancy theories, it would be preferable to use 
existing theories rather than continue the development of 
new theories. Such an approach would be more parsimonious 
and would have the advantage of utilizing the body of 
knowledge associated with existing theories. One problem 
with making such an evaluation is that, at the moment, there 
is no consensus as to how the terms should be.defined, or 
even whether goal acceptance and goal commitment are two 
different constructs or are the same construct. 
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Locke et al. (1988) define goal commitment as "the 
attachment to or determination to reach a goal," and assume 
that goal acceptance is a special case of the more general 
goal commitment construct (the attachment to an assigned 
goal). In an earlier paper Locke et al. (1981) define goal 
commitment as the determination to keep trying for a goal, 
and goal acceptance as the extent to which one is committed 
to an assigned goal. The authors state that goal acceptance 
and goal commitment can vary independently--even though 
acceptance is defined in terms of commitment! Hollenbeck 
and Klein (1987) conclude that while commitment to difficult 
goals should be distinguished from acceptance of difficult 
goals, goal acceptance and goal commitment will be treated 
as a single construct (goal commitment) because there is 
considerable overlap between the two and because goal 
acceptance/goal commitment have been used interchangeably in 
previous research. Leifer and McGannon (1986) and Naylor & 
Ilgen (1984), on the other hand, view goal acceptance and 
goal commitment as conceptually and, in the case of Leifer 
and McGannon, empirically different constructs (Leifer & 
McGannon's factor analysis produced independent factors for 
goal acceptance and goal commitment). 
The literature reviewed thus far indicates a great deal 
of confusion exists over whether the goal acceptance and 
goal commitment constructs are the same or different, how 
they should be predicted, or how they are related to the 
expectancy choice or expectancy force model. 
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An Inteqrated Model 
A recent development in goal setting research offers an 
insight which can be used to resolve the perceived conflict 
between the goal setting and expectancy force model, the 
perceived conflict between the expectancy choice and the 
expectancy force model, and the ambiguity and confusion over 
the goal acceptance/goal commitment constructs. Garland 
(1984) and Locke et al. {1986) observed that even when 
ability is controlled there are two types of performance 
variance: variance between assigned goal levels, and 
variance within assigned goal levels. Each of these two 
types of variance requires a different type of explanation. 
variance Between Goal Levels 
An integrated goal setting/expectancy choice model can 
explain the variance in effort between groups assigned 
different goal levels. This model attributes the 
differences in effort to differences in goals: individuals 
assigned hard goals have chosen to pursue more difficult 
goals than individuals assigned easy goals. This model is 
based on the assumption that a cognitive decision making 
process occurs between goal assignment and individual goal 
formation (Erez et al., 1983; Locke, 1968; Locke et al., 
1970). The models of Evans (1986), Daehler & Mobley (1973), 
and Vroom (1964) discussed earlier specify the constructs 
involved in the cognitive decision making process, and 
provide specific, testable hypotheses about how the decision 
will be made. 
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Inteqrated Goal Choice Model 
Assigned Expectancy Individual 
--> Choice --> --> Effort 
Goal Model Goal 
For this model to be valid goal assignment must affect 
individual goal choice by affecting either expectancies, or 
valences. Naylor and Ilgen (1984) proposed that the primary 
effect of goal assignment is on the product-to-evaluation 
contingency function (the function which describes an 
individual's beliefs about how various performance levels 
will be evaluated, and subsequently rewarded) . For example, 
money and other incentives would influence goal choice by 
making high goal levels more attractive than low goal 
levels. This hypothesis has not been tested. Matusi et al. 
(1981) do provide some evidence consistent with Garland's 
hypothesis. They demonstrated that (contrary to Atkinson's 
assumption of decreasing valences at high goal levels) an 
increase in goal level may result in an increase in the 
intrinsic satisfaction of goal achievement. 
Garland (1985) views goal assignment as a form of 
social influence. He argures that people use assigned goals 
as a source of information about the expectations of goal 
assignors, as well as the probability of successful 
performing at various goal levels. 
He proposes that 1) performance valence is a negative 
function of assigned task goals and performance expectancy, 
and 2) performance expectancy is a positive function of 
assigned task goal and ability. The performance valence 
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term is the sum of the valence of reaching each of several 
goal levels. The performance expectancy term is the sum of 
the probability of reaching at least each of several goal 
levels and is the same as what Bandura, 1977; Locke et al., 
1984; and Locke et al., 1986 have called self-efficacy. 
Garland reasons that when an individual has been 
assigned a goal he/she will believe that in order to receive 
a positive evaluation from the person assigning the goal, 
performance will have to be at the assigned level or higher. 
Therefore, goal levels lower than the assigned goal level 
will have less valence than goal levels equal to, or greater 
than, the assigned goal level. For example, if there are 
three possible goal levels, ranging from easy (1) to hard 
(3), and if individual A has been assigned goal level 2 
while individual B has been assigned goal level 3, both 
levels 2 and 3 would have positive valence for individual A, 
while only level 3 would have positive valence for 
individual B. This means that individual B would have a 
higher goal, but a lower summed valence (a negative 
correlation between the summed valences and goals) . 
The positive relationship between assigned goals and 
performance expectancies is based on the assumption that an 
individual will believe that it must be possible to achieve 
an assigned goal, or authority figures (supervisors, 
experimenters, etc.) would not have assigned the goal. Goal 
assignment will cause an individual assigned a hard goal to 
believe the probability of reaching any given goal level is 
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higher than will an individual assigned an easy goal. For 
example if indiviudal A is assigned a difficult goal 
level (3) while individual B is assigned an· easy goal 
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level (1) then, according to Garland, individual A will 
reason that it must be possible to perform a level 3, or the 
goal would not have been assigned. individual B, on the 
other hand, will believe that goal level 3 must be 
impossible or they would have been assigned goal level 3 
instead of goal level 2. Consequently, Garland predicts 
that individual A will assign a higher probability of 
success to each of the goal levels than will individual B. 
Hypotheses 1-4 summarize these arguments. 
HlA: If a goal level (G) is assigned, then the 
intrinsic satisfaction of achieving the assigned 
goal level G will be higher than the intrinsic 
satisfaction of achieving goal levels lower than 
the assigned goal level (Naylor & Ilgen, 1984). 
HlB: The summed valence of reaching each of all 
possible goal levels will be higher in the 
moderate goal condition than in the hard goal 
condition (Garland, 1985). 
H2: Subjects in the hard goal condition will 
assign a higher subjective probability to 
achieving a given goal level (G) than the 
subjective probability assigned to the same goal 
level by subjects in the moderate goal condition. 
(Garland, 1985). 
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The third hypothesis tests the ability of the expectancy 
choice portion of the model to predict goal choice. 
H3: If faced with a choice among goal levels, 
then the individual will choose the goal level 
with the highest expected value. 
Hypothesis four test the relationship between the unified 
model and goal acceptance. 
H4: If the difference between an individual's 
goal and assigned goal decreases, then goal 
acceptance will increase. 
Variance Within a Goal Level 
46 
Variance due to goal acceptance. The variance in 
effort within a goal group could be due to the fact that an 
individual has chosen to pursue a different goal than the 
one assigned (lack of goal acceptance). Using goal 
acceptance to explain the within-group variance results in 
exactly the same model (the goal choice model) just used to 
explain between group variance. Erez et al. (1983) have 
proposed that when individuals are assigned goals, the 
decision is whether or not to accept the assigned goal. The 
problem with their explanation is that they have lumped all 
goals other than the assigned goal into the goal rejection 
option. Therefore, the model is incapable of predicting 
which goal the individual will choose if he/she does not 
accept the assigned goal. 
The problem can be resolved if the decision to accept 
or not to accept a goal is recognized as a special case of 
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the more general expectancy goal choice model. The 
expectancy choice model can be used on a within-subjects 
basis to predict the goal the individual will choose. Goal 
acceptance would be defined as the difference between the 
individual's goal and the assigned goal (Hannan, 1975; 
Naylor & Ilgen, 1984). This approach has the advantage of 
defining and measuring goal acceptance very specifically, 
and specifying the relationship between goal acceptance and 
the expectancy choice model. It also allows goal acceptance 
to be predicted on an a priori basis. 
Researchers have relied exclusively on differences in 
individual goals to explain variation in performance within 
a goal group. Garland (1984) hypothesizes that, within a 
group with the same assigned goal level, the probability of 
success and performance tend to be positively related and he 
argures that performance increases because an increase in 
the probability of success has results in higher individual 
goals and subsequently higher performance. Both Garland 
(1984) and Locke et al. (1984) report empirical results 
consistent with this hypothesis. Locke et al. (1984) tested 
a model which hypothesized that self-efficacy would be 
positively related to goals, which in turn would be 
positively related to performance. They also proposed a 
direct, positive relationship between self-efficacy and 
performance. Both the path coefficient between self-
efficacy and goals, and the path coefficient between self-
efficacy and performance were significant. The authors' 
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explanation is that a higher self-efficacy score indicates 
higher probabilities of success at higher goal l~vels which 
results in more difficult goals being set and therefore 
higher performance. Hypothesizing that probabilities (or 
self-efficacy) affect performance through their effect on 
individual goals is consistent with the significant 
relationship between self-efficacy and goals and the 
significant relationship between goals and performance. The 
hypothesis, however, does not explain the significant 
relationship between self-efficacy and performance. A 
significant relationship between self-efficacy and 
performance (with the influence of goals on performance 
already accounted for) would require variance in performance 
which is not due to differences in individual goals. 
variance due to goal commitment. If the within group 
variance is not due to differences in individual goals, what 
is it due to? The most likely explanation is that even 
though individuals have the same goal, they vary in their 
commitment to the goal. Although two individuals have the 
same goal, one may be much more willing to exert effort 
toward achieving the goal than the other (Naylor & Ilgen, 
1984). Using goal commitment to explain the performance 
variance, however, does little good unless one can also 
explain the variance in commitment. 
Fortunately, such an explanation already exists. As 
was discussed earlier, the central hypothesis of the 
expectancy force model is that changes in motivational force 
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(expected utility) result in variance in effort--even when 
individuals have the same goal. It seems reasonable to 
believe that the reason an increases in the expected value 
of goal achievement results in increased effort is because 
it increases commitment to the goal. An individual offered 
one million dollars for producing ten widgets should be more 
committed to producing 10 widgets than the individual 
offered one dollar for producing 10 widgets. This 
hypothesis is consistent with Bandura, from whom Locke et 
al. (1986) and Garland (1985) have borrowed the concept of 
self-efficacy. Even though Bandura never included the 
incentive value of a goal in empirical tests of his 
theories, he includes the incentive value of the goal in his 
theory as one of the determinants of effort (Bandura, 1977). 
This would mean that a change in valences or a change 
in expectancies may have two effects. One would be to 
change an individual's goal by affecting goal choice. The 
other would be to change an individual's commitment to a 
goal by increasing the expected utility of goal achievement. 
Integrated Goal Commitment Model 
Assigned Expectancy Goal 
--> Force --> -> Effort 
Goal Model Commitment 
This suggests that the performance variance within a 
group with the same assigned goal observed by Garland (1984) 
and Locke et al. (1984) may not be the result of differences 
in individual goals, but, instead, may be caused by 
differences in the expected value of goal achievement. Such 
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a hypothesis is consistent with their observation that 
increases in the probability of success within a goal group 
were associated with increases in performance. Consider the 
example illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. (Assume the 
valences of not reaching a particular goal level to be zero. 
Locke et al. (1986) implicitly make the same assumption.) 
As the example in Figures 4 and 5 illustrate, it is the 
utility of the goal which is changing as self-efficacy 
changes, not the goal level (both individuals would choose 
goal level 4). While the specific numbers used in the 
example can be questioned, they do contain several 
characteristics which make them consistent with the 
hypotheses discussed thus far. The example is consistent 
with empirical results obtained by Matusi et al. (1981) 
because the valences increase as goal level increases; the 
probabilities are decreasing across goal levels as Motowidlo 
et al. (1978) and Mento et al. (1980) suggest, and the self-
efficacy scores are consistent with Locke et al. (1984); 
Locke et al. (1986). The example is also consistent with 
empirical tests of single force models which have found the 
motivation force score to be a significant predictor of 
effort (Schwab et al., 1979)--even when the within-subject 
goal choice has been taken into account (Daehler & Mobley, 
1973; Kennedy et al. 1983). 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Fiqure 4 
Example of Changes in Probabilities Which Change Force but 
Not Goals 
Goal Level Probability Valence* Ex12ected 
Value 
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• 3 12 
~ 14 
3.5 
B A B 
2 1.4 1. 6 
4 2.4 2.8 
6 3.0 3.6 
8 3.2 4.0 
10 3.0 4.0 
12 2.4 3.6 
14 1.4 2.8 
The numbers in the example result in the following utility 
curves. 
* even if Atkinson's assumption of decreasing valences were 
used the conclusions would not change 
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Figure s 
utility curve for the Example in Figure 4 
EV 
I 
41 B B I B A B 
31 B A A B I A A 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 GL 
EV = Expected value 
GL Goal level 
A Individual A 
B = Individual B 
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In Daehler & Mobley's study, in Plant 2 both the 
correlation between the predicted goal level and performance 
(.12) and the correlation between maximum expected utility 
and performance (.18) were significant. The results are 
consistent with both a goal choice and motivational force 
model. The approach used to obtain the motivational force 
scores in this study is different from the approach used in 
other between-subjects expectancy models in that they do not 
obtain force scores for an arbitrarily choosen goal level 
(such as high performance) but, instead, use the MFS 
calculated for the individual's predicted or stated goal 
level. This approach provides a theoretical justification 
for the goal level used. This theoretical justification is 
lacking in previous between subjects models and will be used 
in this study. 
Kennedy et al. (1983) compared a within-subject model 
with a between-subjects model, and a force, choice, and 
difference model. The results indicate that the choice and 
the difference models yield significantly higher 
correlations than the single alternative model, but the 
correlations for the single alternative model were 
significant. 
The recognition that differences in effort may be due 
to either differences in goals or due to differences in the 
commitment to a goa~ also removes the only remaining 
obstacle to integrating all three theories--the perceived 
conflict between the expectancy theory choice model and the 
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expectancy theory force model. Instead of being in 
conflict, each theory is explaining a different type of 
variance. The choice model is explaining goal choice which 
in turn explains differences in effort due to differences in 
goals. The force model is explaining the motivational force 
toward a goal which in turn explains the variance in the 
amount of effort exerted to achieve a goal. This would 
indicate that the force model is not just an inadequate 
operationalization of the choice model as indicated by some 
reviewers, but is a different conceptualization of the 
theory, one which recognizes the importance of the force 
toward a goal, not just the relative difference in force 
between goals. It would also indicate that the choice model 
and the force model are not contradictory, as the previous 
research reviewed would indicate, but are complementary. 
Although previous research has not explicity recognized 
the conceptual relationship between the expectancy force 
model and the expectancy choice model proposed here, the 
idea that effort may change even though the performance goal 
has not changed can be seen in the writing of earlier 
theorticians. Vroom (1964), for example, clearly viewed the 
product of expectancies and valences as producing a "force" 
on an individual to act. To capture this conceptualization 
he used the term "motivational force score" to refer to the 
product of the expectancies and valences instead of more 
commonly used decision science terms such as "expected 
value" or "expected utility." Vroom (1964, p. 263) states 
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other things being equal, we would expect the 
performance of workers to increase as the valence 
of effective performance increases. 
Locke et al. (1981) state that one way incentives affect 
performance is to 
arouse the willingness to expend more effort to 
attain a given objective than not offering money 
[incentives]. 
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This would explain why in some studies (such as Terborg, 
1976) money has had an effect on performance independent of 
its effect on goal level. 
The notion that effort varies with the strength of the 
expected utility of goal achievement is similar to earlier 
psychological theories of motivation. For example, need 
theories (i.e. Maslow, 1954) which developed apart from the 
decision science models such as Edwards, (1954) that Vroom 
relied on in formulating his version of expectancy theory, 
argue that the intensity of effort is a function of the 
strength of the need. Tolman's performance vector (1959), 
Atkinson's aroused motivation (1958b), and Rotter's behavior 
potential (1955) contain a similar conceptualization and are 
similar to Vroom's conceptualization of motivational force 
(Vroom, 1964, p. 18). The integrated goal commitment model 
results in the following hypotheses: 
HS: If the utility of a goal increases, then 
commitment toward the goal will incr~ase. 
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H6: If commitment to a goal increases, then 
effort toward the goal will increase. 
H7: If an individual's goal level increases, then 
effort will increase. 
Proposed Unified Theory 
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The literature reviewed suggests that while goal level 
may be one explanation for differences in performance, goal 
level alone is inadequate. In addition to goals, the 
magnitude of the expected value of goal achievement has a 
direct effect on performance by increasing goal commitment. 
This indicates that a within-subjects expectancy choice 
model should be used to predict an individual's goal (and 
subsequently goal acceptance), and an expectancy force model 
should be used to predict goal commitment. An integrated 
model which contains both personal goals and goal commitment 
should then be used to predict effort and performance. The 
result is a unified performance motivation theory which 
integrates the goal setting, goal choice, and goal force 
theories (see Figure 6). Assigned goals are hypothesized to 
affect both goal choice and the force toward a goal by 
influencing the valence of goals and the probability of 
achieving goals. The expectancy choice model predicts the 
individual's goal level, while the expectancy force model 
predicts goal commitment. The individual's goal level and 
the individual's commitment to that goal level are 
hypothesized to be the primary motivational determinants of 
effort. Effort, within the constraints of the environment 
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and ability, predicts performance. Ability and 
environmental constraints are hypothesized to influence 
choice by influencing an individual's perception of the 
probability and valence of achieving various goal levels. 
They are also hypothesized to directly influence effort and 
performance, although these linkages are not tested in this 
study. 
The proposed theory is an improvement on existing 
motivation theories because it explains both the choice and 
intensity of behavior. The proposed theory resolves the 
existing confusion between goal acceptance and goal 
commitment by making clear that motivational force and/or 
goal commitment occurs with respect to a specific goal. If 
goal commitment is measured with respect to the assigned 
goal, then goal acceptance and goal commitment are the same. 
If goal commitment is measured with respect to the 
individual's personal goal, then goal commitment and goal 
acceptance are not the same. As explained earlier, the 
model also eliminates the perceived conflict between goal 
setting and expectancy theory and between the expectancy 
choice model and the expectancy force model. The model 
provides an explanation as to why an individual will choose 
one performance goal level but not another, why an 
individual will accept one assigned goal but not another, or 
why individuals with the same goal level may exert different 
amounts of effort. 
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Alternative formulations. Kennedy et al. (1983) 
propose that not only may the magnitude of the motivational 
force score affect effort, but the magnitude of the 
difference between the MFS for high effort and the MFS for 
low effort may affect effort. The hypothesis is that the 
greater the difference, the greater the motivation and 
performance. If this model is correct, then not only may 
goal level (the maximum point of the utility curve) and goal 
utility (the height of the utility curve) affect effort, but 
the slope of the utility curve may be important as well. 
Tests which have compared the single-alternative model, 
the choice model, and the difference model have concluded 
that the choice and difference models outperform the single 
force model, but the difference model performs as well or 
better than the choice model (Kennedy et al. 1983). 
Kopelman, Liebman, and Yukl (1978) tested what they referred 
to as a return-on-effort model. Return on effort was 
operationalized as the difference between the expected value 
of high effort and the expected value of low effort which 
indicates that the return on effort model and the difference 
model are the same. The correlation between return-on-
effort and performance was higher than the correlation 
between motivational force and performance. The tests of 
these models did not use a marginal test of significance (by 
testing the increase in the significance of the model when 
one of the constructs is added to a model which already 
contains the other constructs). 
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The first seven hypotheses derived from the unified 
model test the various linkages in the model against a null 
model. For the unified model to be supported hypotheses 1-7 
(particularly 3-7) should be supported. If the unified 
model is correct the immediate motivational determinants of 
effort are goal level and goal commitment. Therefore the 
unified model should predict better than any single 
construct (such as goals) and, adding additional 
motivational variables (such as, assigned goal level, self-
efficacy, summed valence, motivational force, or slope) 
should not significantly improve the predictive ability of 
the model. The following hypotheses tests the unified model 
against alternative formulations. 
Hypothesis 8 test the unified model against the 
traditional goal choice model. support for this hypothesis 
indicates support for the unified theory, rejection 
indicates support for the traditional goal choice model. 
HS: Adding goal commitment to a model that 
contains an individual's predicted goal (predicted 
on a within-subject basis using the expectancy 
choice model) will significantly improve the 
predictive ability of the model. 
H9: Adding assigned goals to a model that 
contains goal commitment and an individual's goal 
will not significantly improve the predictive 
ability of the model. 
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Hypothesis 9 tests the unified model against the traditional 
goal setting model,and Hypothesis 10 tests the unified 
theory against the traditional expectancy force model. 
H10: Adding the motivational force score for high 
performance to a model that contains an 
individual's goal and goal commitment will not 
significantly improve the model's ability to 
predict. 
Hypothesis 11 test the unified theory against the 
alternative formulations which use slope (return on effort) 
(Kennedy et al., 1983; Kopelman et al., 1978). 
H11: Adding the slope of the utility curve to a 
model that contains an individual's goal and goal 
commitment, will not significantly increase the 
model's ability to predict. 
Hypotheses 12 and 13 tests the unified model against 
models that use self-efficacy or summed valence measures 
(i.e. Locke et al., 1986; Garland, 1985). 
H12: Adding self-efficacy to a model that 
contains an individual's goal and goal commitment, 
will not significantly increase the model's 
ability to predict. 
H13: Adding summed valence to a model that 
contains an individual's goal and goal commitment, 
will not significantly increase the model's 
ability to predict. 
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The hypotheses tested in this dissertation improve on 
existing tests in several ways. First, they directly test 
the effect of goal assignment on expectancies and valences 
which has not been done. Second, they test the ability of a 
within-subject choice model to predict goal choice. The 
only other equivalent test was Daehler & Mobley (1973) which 
was inconclusive. Also, the relationship between 
motivational force and commitment and between goal choice 
and goal acceptance is tested (neither relationship has 
previously been tested). Finally, the predictive ability of 
the unified model is tested against the expectancy choice 
model, the expectancy force model, and the goal setting 
model. Previous research has only tested each model against 
a null model, not with each other. 
The findings should not only be of value to academics, 
but practitioners as well, particularly in the design and 
implementation of reward systems. Support for the goal 
model indicates that rewards may not be important as long as 
difficult goals are assigned. Support for the goal choice 
model indicates that the magnitude of the reward is 
irrelevant as long as high performance is rewarded more than 
low performance. Support for a goal force model indicates 
that the size or magnitude of the reward is the determinant 
of motivation. Support for the unified model indicates that 
both an individual's goal level and the perceived 
consequences of goal achievement are significant predictors 
of motivation, and that both must be considered when 
designing motivation systems. 





The goal of this study was to make causal inferences 
about variance in effort within and between goal levels. 
Therefore, a laboratory experiment was used to maximize both 
the within-goal and between-goal variance in those variables 
hypothesized to influence effort-probabilities, valences, 
and goals. The experimental design is a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial 
design with two covariates. The factors were: 1) assigned 
goal level, 2) probabilities, and 3) valences with sex and 
ability as covariates. Although sex differences were not a 
central issue in this research, sex was included as a 
covariate because it is possible that men and women react to 
goal assignment or goal difficulty differently. 
A between subjects design was used because a between 
subjects design makes it more difficult for subjects to 
figure out the experimental manipulations. Pany & Reckers 
(1986) have demonstrated that within-subject designs can 
lead to misleading conclusions because respondents are 
easily able to perceive the manipulations within the task 
and infer the focus of the research, introducing the 
possibility of a strong demand effect. 
Some reviewers have concluded that expectancy theory 
requires a within-subject design (Connolly & Wolf, 1981; 
Kopelman, 1977; Mitchell, 1982; Wolf & Connolly, 1981). 
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They base their conclusion on the fact that Vroom's theory 
requires a within-subject choice. A within-subject choice, 
however, is not the same thing as a within-subject design. 
In a within-subject design the same subject is administered 
various levels of the experimental treatment. A subject can 
be given a choice among many performance levels even if no 
treatments are given. As Kennedy et al. (1983) point out, 
the question is whether a choice model is used, or a single 
alternative model is used (see Chapter 2 for a discussion of 
the differences in these models) not whether a within or 
between subjects design is used. 
The between subjects design has been criticized because 
the failure to adequately account for individual differences 
may lead one to conclude that a theory is not valid, when in 
fact the theory is valid (Kennedy et al., 1983; Kopelman, 
1977). However, individual differences can be dealt with, 
as they were in this study, by using randomization, or, by 
measuring the variable and including it as a covariate. 
Between-subjects design have also been criticized because 
the lack of a ratio level valence measure (Arnold & Evans, 
1979) makes between subjects comparisons impossible. 
Sussman & Vecchio (1985), however, demonstrate that it is 
possible to obtain a ratio level measure of valence 
compatible with Vroom's (1964) theory. 
subjects 
The subjects were 253 undergraduate college students of 
Western Michigan University enrolled in the Introduction to 
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statistics course. The students were given extra class 
points· for participating in the experiment. The subjects 
were told the purpose of the experiment was to create a data 
base which could be used by future statistics students. 
45% were female. 58% were sophomores, 34% juniors, and the 
remainder seniors or graduate students. 77% were between 
the ages of 18 and 21. The majority of the sample (91%) was 
white. 23% worked 40 or more hours a week, 45% worked 
between 20 and 40 hours per week, and 22% worked between 
o and 20 hours per week. The experiment was conducted 
during the students' normally scheduled class time. The 
subjects were randomly assigned to conditions by class 
section. 
Task 
The task was a ring toss similar to Atkinson and Litwin 
(1960), Litwin (1966), and Hamilton (1974). Based on 
personal conversations with Hamilton the equipment was 
constructed to be as similar to that used by Hamilton (1974) 
as possible. The equipment consisted of a peg 12 inches 
high and 1 1/4 inches in diameter. The peg was inserted 
into a hole in a 2 ft. by 2 ft. by 3/4 in. plywood base. 
The result was a stake similar to those used in horseshoes. 
Ten inch diameter rings were constructed from 3/8 in. 
flexible plastic tubing. The task was to go from a line to 
a box of rings, obtain one ring, return to the line, and 
attempt to toss the ring over the stake (see Figure 7). The 
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over the stake. 
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Each trial was two minutes long and the students could 
throw as many rings during the two minutes as they chose to 
throw (the box contained 21 rings and no one was able to 
retrieve and throw 21 rings during a two minute trial) . 
Experimental Manipulations. 
The sequence of trials, manipulation, and measurement 
is indicated in Figure 8. The subjects participated in the 
ring toss trials in groups of eighteen (eighteen stakes were 
set up in an old gym adjacent to the college). This meant 
that while one-half the class was completing the ring toss 
the other half of the class was filling out a questionnaire. 
During the pretrial period, subjects were told they would 
have two minutes to score as many points as possible. 
Goal manipulation. Goals levels were manipulated by 
telling the subjects that while the task was new to them, it 
was actually an ancient Chinese game (which my Chinese 
graduate assistant assured me was true), and that the 
Chinese try to score either six (moderate goal condition) or 
nine (extremely difficult goal condition) points within the 
two minute period. They were then told that now that they 
were familiar with the game they would be given another two 
minute period to play the "real" Chinese game, and that 
their goal for the next period should be to score either six 
or nine (depending on the goal condition) points. 
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Figure 8 
sequence of Trials and Questionnaire Measures 
1. Pretrial 
2. Measure Effort & Performance 
3. Assign goal and Inform of Reward if Applicable 
4. Complete Questionnaire 1 
5. Trial 1 
6. Measure Effort & Performance; Complete Questionnaire 2 
7. Trial 2 
8. Measure Effort & Performance; Complete Questionnaire 3 
68 
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Probability manipulation. Probabilities were 
manipulated by changing the distance between the line and 
the stake. Subjects in the moderate probability condition 
threw from a line which was 9 ft. from the stake (a priori 
objective probability of scoring a ringer equals .4); 
subjects in the low probability condition threw from a line 
which was 11 ft. from the stake (a priori objective 
probability of scoring a ringer equals .2). The stake was 
moved, not the line. This was done so that the distance 
between the line and the box would be 25 ft. in all 
conditions. 
Valence manipulation. Valences were manipulated by 
telling the subjects in the reward condition that they would 
receive a reward if they scored at least the assigned number 
of points. The reward was a packet of coupons good for free 
food at a variety of fast food establishments (Mc Donalds, 
Burger King, Little Ceasar's Pizza, Pizza Hut). The 
approximate monetary value of the coupon packet was seven 
dollars. 
Questionnaire Measures 
Several of the variables were measured through 
questionnaires. A copy of the complete questionnaire is 
included in Appendix A. 
Goals. The assigned goal measure asked subjects if 
their assigned goal was a) to score 4 points, b) to score 
6 points, c) to score 9 points), d) to score 11 points, or 
e) something else. 
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The individual goal measure asked subjects if their personal 
goal was a) to score 1 or less points, b) to score 2 or 
3 points, c) to score 4 or 5 points, d) to score 6 or 
7 points, e) to score 8 or 9 points, f) to score 10 or 
11 points, g) to score more than 11 points, h) to do your 
best, or i) something else. The goals were paired to reduce 
the number of responses subjects had to make. The effort 
goal measure asked subjects if they intended to a) run, 
b) jog, c) walk normally, or d) walk slowly during the next 
period. 
Expectancies. Subjects were asked the probability of 
scoring a) 1 or more points, b) 2 or more points, c) 3 or 
more points, d) 4 or more points, e) 5 or more points, 
f) 6 or more points, g) 7 or more points, h) 8 or more 
points, i) 9 or more points, j) 10 or more points, k) 11 or 
more points. These probabilities were summed to calculate 
self-efficacy (Locke et al., 1986). 
Valences. While a variety of other anchors for valence 
have been tried (such as behaviorally anchored rating 
scales, and importance) there is little evidence that they 
are superior to attractiveness or anticipated satisfaction 
(Ilgen et al., 1981; Pecotich and Churchill, 1981). 
Therefore, valences were measured by asking students how 
attractive they found the idea of 1) walking slowly, 
2) walking normally, 3) jogging, and 4) running. They were 
also asked how attractive they found the idea of scoring 
a) 1 or less points, b) 2 or 3 points, c) 4 or 5 points, 
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d) 6 or 7 points, e) 8 or 9 points, f) 10 or 11 points, and 
g) more than 11 points. The third measure asked subjects 
how satisfied they would be if they scored a) 1 or more 
points, b) 2 or more points, c) 3 or more points, d) 4 or 
more points, e) 5 or more points, f) 6 or more points, 
g) 7 or more points, h) 8 or more points, i) 9 or more 
points, j) 10 or more points, or k) 11 or more points. The 
valence of each of the performance levels was summed to 
obtain Garland's (1985) summed valence measure. 
In the extrinsic reward condition subjects were asked 
how attractive they found the reward, and how much they 
would pay for a packet of coupons. 
Goal acceptance/goal commitment. Questionnaire items 
were developed for the goal acceptance and goal commitment 
constructs so self-report measures could be used to test the 
hypotheses in Chapter 2. The questionnaire items included 
the goal commitment items used by Hollenbeck, Williams, and 
Klein (in press) as well as the goal acceptance and goal 
commitment items used by Leifer and McGannon (1986). 
Principle components factor analysis (see Table 1) indicated 
that the questionnaire items loaded on three factors (the 
criteria for retaining a factor was an igenvalue equal to or 
greater than one, and items had to load .40 or greater on a 
factor to be retained). The three factors produced by the 
analysis were labeled goal acceptance, positive goa~ 
commitment, and negative goal commitment. 
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The items loading on the goal acceptance and positive 
commitment factors are the ones obtained from Leifer and 
McGannon (1986). However, the factor structure is not the 
same as theirs. The difference may be due to the fact that 
their analysis had 12 items and only 32 subjects. The 
results presented here are from an analysis of forty items. 
The analysis used all questionnaires completed during the 
experiment (605 useable questionnaires). The data set 
contained three questionnaires from each subject (each 
subject completed the same questionnaire three different 
times; see Figure 8). The analysis was also done separately 
for each time period with only Leifer and McGannon's (1986) 
items; and with just Leifer and McGannon (1986) and 
Hollenbeck et al.'s (in press) items, but the results were 
essentially the same. The only difference across these 
analysis is that if only Leifer and McGannon's items are 
used there is no negative commitment factor (since all the 
questionnaire items loading on the negative commitment 
factor are Hollenbeck's). This would indicate that the goal 
acceptance factor and the positive goal commitment factor 
are not influenced by the presence or absence of 
Hollenbeck's items. 
The factors labeled postive or negative commitment may 
not be measuring commitment in the same way commitment was 
conceptualized in Chapter 2. Traditionally, goal commitment 
has been used to refer to assigned goals. In Chapter 2, 
however, goal commitment was defined as the willingness to 
exert effort toward an individual goal. 
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Table 1 
Factor Loadings for Goal Acceptance/Goal Commitment Items 
Goal Acceptance Items 
Factor 
Loadings 
1. How hard will you honestly try to achieve your .80 
personal goal? 
2. Acceptance of a goal means assuming the assigned .76 
goal as your own personal goal. To what extent do 
you accept the assigned goal for this game? 
3. Of the maximum effort (100%) you could exert in .76 
pursuit of your goal, what percentage do you think 
you will exert? 
4. To what extent will you strive to attain your goal? .77 
5. To what extent to you honestly accept the .73 
performance goal determined for you on this task? 
Cronbach's alpha = .90 Test-retest .78 
Positive Goal Commitment Items 
1. How enthusiastic are you about attempting to .70 
achieve your personal goal? 
2. Commitment to a goal means the determination .73 
and persistence to achieve a goal. To what 
extent are you committed to your goal? 
3. How determined are you to reach your performance .67 
goal 
Cronbach's alpha= .71 Test-retest .56 
Negative Goal Commitment Items 
1. There's not much to be gained by trying to .56 
achieve this goal 
2. It is quit possible that this goal needs to be .54 
changed 
3. Quite frankly, I don't care if I achieve this .49 
goal or not. 
4. It's unrealistic for me to expect to reach this .49 
goal 
5. It wouldn't take long for me to abandon this goal .68 
6. Since it's hard to tell how hard a goal is until .68 
you've played a game for awhile, it's hard for 
me to take this goal seriously 
Cronbach's alpha = .87 Test-retest= .74 
* test-retest correlation coefficients are between Trials 1 
& 2 
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An attempt was made to obtain a separate measure of 
commitment to the assigned goal and commitment to the 
individual's goal by phrasing some of the questions so that 
they ask about "your goal," or "your personal goal," while 
other questions ask about assigned goals. Instead of 
obtaining two factors, however, only one factor which 
contained both types of questions emerged. This may mean 
that individuals were responding to all the questions as 
though they referred to either individual or assigned goals, 
or it may mean that for most individuals assigned and 
individual goals were the same. 
Ability Measure. Ability was measured as the number of 
ringers scored during the pretrial. 
Critera Measures. During each trial, effort was 
measured as the number of feet traveled by the subject 
during the two minutes, and performance as the number of 
ringers scored in two minutes. 




Chapter 4 presents the results of the analysis of the 
data collected during the experiment. First, the results of 
tests of the experimental manipulations are presented. The 
experimental manipulations were analyzed to determine if the 
manipulations had created significant variance in the 
variables manipulated. Next, the results of the tests of 
the hypotheses related to each major linkage in the model 
presented in Chapter 2 are discussed. 
Manipulation Checks 
Goal assignment. The goal assignment manipulation was 
checked by asking subjects what their assigned goal was. 
Ten subjects were dropped because they reported assigned 
goals other than the one actually assigned to their group. 
Subjects were also asked, "How difficult do you think it 
will be to achieve the performance goal you were assigned?" 
(12 point response scale ranging from very easy [1] to very 
difficult [12]). The mean response in the moderate goal 
condition was 7.02 (s.d. = 2.89) and in the hard goal 
condition the mean response was 8.17 (s.d. = 2.58). The 
perceived difficulty in the hard goal condition was 
significantly higher than in the moderate goal condition 
(p < .001) which indicates the manipulation was successful. 
Probabilities. Subjects in the low probability 
condition (11 ft. from the stake) should have perceived 
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lower probabilities of scoring points than subjects in the 
moderate probability condition (9 ft. from the stake). As 
Table 2 shows, in Trial 1 the subjective probability of 
achieving each goal level was higher in the moderate 
probability condition than in the low probability condition, 
indicating a successful manipulation. 
Valences. The valence/reward manipulation was checked 
by asking subjects in the reward condition how attractive 
they found the coupons. The average response of 3.3 on a 7 
point scale (from highly attractive [1] to highly 
unattractive [7] suggests subjects found the prize somewhat 
attractive. The average amount subjects would pay for a 
packet of coupons was $1.18. 
There is some question about whether offering an 
extrinsic reward increases or decreases intrinsic 
satisfaction (Deci, 1976). In this experiment the reward 
was offered for achieving the assigned goal. If Deci is 
correct the intrinsic satisfaction of achieving the assigned 
goal (either 6 or 9 ringers) should be different between the 
reward and no-reward group. Table 3 and 4 compare the 
attractiveness of the two assigned goal levels for the 
reward and no-reward conditions. As can be seen from Table 
3, during Trial 1 subjects perceived the goal of scoring 6 
or 7 ringers to be more attractive in the no-reward 
condition. In Trial 2, however, there was no significant 
difference between the groups (Table 4). The attractiveness 
of scoring 8 or 9 ringers was not significantly different in 
the reward/no-reward conditions during Trial 1 or Trial 2. 
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Table 2 
Probabilities-Low vs. Moderate Probability Condition 
Trial 1 
Prob. of 
scoring Low Prob. Moderate Prob. E 













* p < .10 
*** p < .01 
.82 .85 2.62* 
.74 .83 9.74*** 
.67 .80 19.36*** 
.58 .76 27.09*** 
.48 .70 44.42*** 
.40 .64 64.38*** 
.29 .56 84.37*** 
.21 .49 82.85*** 
.15 .41 69.90*** 
.09 .30 57.93*** 
.07 .20 22.42*** 
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8 or 9 ringers 
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The one significant difference in Trial 1 supports Deci's 
theory, but the three non-significant differences do not 
support his theory. 
Test of the Linkage Between Goal Assignment and 
Expectancies/Valences 
80 
The unified model views goal assignment as an external 
event that affects motivation by influencing expectancies 
and/or valences and subsequently goal choice and 
motivational force. The first three hypotheses test this 
view by examining the effects of goal assignment on valences 
and expectancies. 
HlA: If a specific goal level (G) is assigned, 
then the intrinsic satisfaction of achieving goal 
level G will be higher than the intrinsic 
satisfaction of achieving any goal level lower 
than the assigned goal level. (Naylor & Ilgen, 
1984) • 
For Hypothesis lA to be supported subjects would have 
to perceive the attractiveness of scoring the assigned 
number of points to be higher than the attractiveness of any 
lower goal level. Table 5 contains the average response to 
the goal attractiveness question for the moderate goal 
condition, and Table 6 contains the same information for the 
hard goal condition. As can be seen from Tables 5 and 6, 
Hypothesis lA is supported. In both goal conditions 
subjects perceive the assigned goal level to be more 
attractive than lower goal levels. 
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Table 5 
Attractiveness of Assiqned Goal Level vs. other Goal Levels 
Moderate Goal condition-Trial 1 
n=113 
Attractiveness Moderate Goal 
of scoring Mean 
< 2 points -.98 
2 or 3 II -. 62 
4 or 5 II .19 
*6 or 7 II .94 
8 or 9 II 1. 48 
10 or 11 II 1. 70 
> 11 II 1. 76 
* Assigned goal 
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Table 6 
Attractiveness of Assigned Goal Level vs. other Goal Levels 
Hard Goal Condition-Trial 1 
n=127 
Attractiveness Moderate Goal 
of scoring Mean 
< 2 points -1.18 
2 or 3 II -.68 
4 or 5 II .05 
6 or 7 II .76 
*8 or 9 II 1.46 
10 or 11 II 1.80 
> ll II 1.85 
* Assigned goal 
The response scale ranged from extremely attractive [2] to 
extremely unattractive [-2]. 
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However, subjects did not perceive the assigned goal 
level more attractive than higher goal levels. The problem 
with this hypothesis is that support for this hypothesis 
does not necessarily mean that goal assignment has affected 
the valence of goals. Subjects may simply prefer harder 
goals. A better test would be to compare the attractiveness 
of the 6 or 7 goal in the moderate and hard goal conditions. 
If goal assignment is having an effect, the moderate goal 
subjects should perceive 6 or 7 to be more attractive than 
the hard goal subjects. The mean attractiveness of the 6 or 
7 goal in the hard goal condition is significantly lower 
Ct= 1.77, p = .04) than the mean score in the moderate goal 
condition which supports the hypothesis that goal assignment 
affects goal valence. 
HlB: The summed valence of reaching each of all 
possible goal levels will be higher in the 
moderate goal condition than in the hard goal 
condition (Garland, 1985). 
Garland's summed valence measure was calculated as: 
Sum Valence = ~ CVi; where i ranges from 1 to 11 and CV 
equals the cumulative valence of scoring 1 or more ringers, 
2 or more ringers, etc. The mean summed valence for the 
moderate goal condition equals 8.6 (s.d.= 8.9). The mean 
summed valence for the hard goal condition equals 6.97 
(s.d. = 9.23). The summed valences are significantly 
different (t = 1.39, p < .10) in the direction hypothesized 
by Garland. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
H2: Subjects in the hard goal condition will 
assign a higher subjective probability to 
achieving a given goal level than the subjective 
probability assigned to the same goal level by 
subjects in the moderate goal condition. (Garland, 
1985) • 
84 
To test Hypothesis 2 one can subtract the average 
subjective probability of achieving any given goal level in 
the hard goal condition from the average subjective 
probability of achieving the same goal level in the moderate 
goal level. If Hypothesis 2 is correct, the differences 
should be negative. Instead, as can be seen from Tables 7 
and 8, the signs of the differences are positive (a sign 
test indicates that the number of positive differences is 
greater than would be expected from chance [P < .05]). 
While there is a significant difference, it is in the 
opposite direction predicted by Garland. Another way to 
test Hypothesis 2 is to compare the mean summed probability 
(or self-efficacy) score for the moderate and hard goal 
conditions. Garland's hypothesis would predict the self-
efficacy score to be higher in the hard goal condition. 
Actually, the average self-efficacy score was 5.7 
(s.d. = 2.5) in the moderate goal condition, and 5.4 
(s.d. = 2.5) in the hard goal condition~ While the 
difference is not statistically significant, it is 
interesting to note that the higher score is in the moderate 
goal condition--opposite the direction predicted by Garland. 
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Probability Moderate Goal Hard Goal Sign of 
of scoring Mean (S.d.) Mean (S.d.) MG-HG 
-------------------------------------------------------
< 2 points .76 (. 36) .78 (.33) 
2 or 3 II .78 (.28) .78 (.22) 0 
4 or 5 II • 67 (.29) .65 (.29) + 
6 or 7 II .53 (. 31) .51 (. 29) + 
8 or 9 II .42 (.32) .39 (.29) + 
10 or 11 II .30 (. 30) .26 (.28) + 
> 11 II .22 (. 28) .20 (.27) + 
-------------------------------------------------------
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Tests of the Linkage between Goal Choice and Individual 
Goals 
87 
The third hypothesis tests the ability of the 
expectancy choice portion of the model to predict individual 
goals. 
H3: If faced with a choice among goal levels, 
then the individual will choose the goal level 
with the highest expected value. 
To test this hypothesis the expected value of each goal 
level was compared with the expected value of all other goal 
levels for each individual. The goal level with the highest 
expected value was the individual's predicted goal level. 
The predicted goal level was then compared to the stated 
goal level by examining the correlation between the 
predicted goal and the individual's stated goal (a within-
subject choice, but a between subjects design). The 
expected value of a goal level was measured as the 
attractiveness of that goal level (see Chapter 2, valence 
measures). 
For Trial 1 the mean predicted effort level was 2.4 
(s.d. = 1.1) while the mean stated effort level goal was 3.2 
(s.d. .62) (l=walk slowly, 2=walk normally, 3=jog, and 
4=run). The correlation between the predicted and stated 
goal level was .39 (p < .01). For Trial 2 the mean 
predicted effort level was 2.1 (s.d. = 1.1) while the mean 
stated effort level goal was 3.1 (s.d. = .73) and the 
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correlation was .37 (p < .01). The significant correlations 
support Hypothesis 3. 
In Trial 1 the mean predicted performance goal was 
6.4 points (s.d. = 2.9) while the stated individual 
performance goal level was 7.0 points (s.d. = 2.4). The 
correlation between predicted and stated goal level is 
.52 (p < .01). In Trial 2 the mean predicted performance 
goal was 6.1 points (s.d. = 3.3) while the stated individual 
performance goal level was 7.0 (s.d. = 2.8) points. The 
correlation between predicted and stated goal level is 
.45 (p < .01). Again, the significant correlations support 
Hypothesis 3. Although the model does not predict the 
absolute goal value very well, it does predict the rank 
ordering of goal level among people. 
Tests of the Linkage between Expected Value, Goal 
Acceptance, & Goal Commitment 
H4: If the difference between an individual's 
goal and assigned goal decreases, then goal 
acceptance will increase. 
HS: If the utility of a goal increases, then 
commitment toward the goal will increase. 
H6: If commitment to a goal increases, then 
effort toward the goal will increase. 
Tables 9 and 10 contain the correlations between the 
difference in individual goals (IG) and assigned goals (AG), 
the various questionnaire measures of goal acceptance/ 
commitment, motivational force score, and effort. The 
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motivational force score (MFS) was the individual's 
anticipated satisfaction with achieving his or her 
individual point goal. Hypothesis 4 indicates that the IG 
minus AG measure should be negatively correlated with the 
goal acceptance measure. As Table 9 shows in Trial 1 the 
correlation was -.28 (p < .01) and in Trial 2 (Table 10) the 
correlation was -.40 (p < .01). The significant 
correlations support Hypothesis 4. 
For Hypothesis 5 to be supported MFS should be 
positively correlated with positive goal commitment and 
negatively correlated with negative goal commitment. In 
fact MFS was significantly correlated with negative goal 
commitment in Trial 1 (r = -.16, p < .05), however, it was 
not significantly correlated with the questionnaire measure 
labeled positive goal commitment. MFS was significantly 
correlated with goal acceptance. The reason MFS was 
significantly correlated with goal acceptance and not 
significantly correlated with positive goal commitment may 
that, as was noted in Chapter 3, the empirical measures of 
goal acceptance and goal commitment do not capture the 
difference in the constructs conceptualized in Chapter 2. 
In Trial 2 MFS was significantly correlated with both 
goal acceptance and positive goal commitment, and 
significantly negatively correlated with negative goal 
commitment (see Table 10). Overall the results support 
Hypothesis 5. 
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Hypothesis 6 tests the linkage between goal commitment 
and effort. In Trial 1 effort was not significantly 
correlated with either the positive or negative goal 
commitment measures (see Table 9). In Trial 2 effort was 
negatively correlated with the negative goal commitment 
measure, but was not significantly correlated with the 
positive goal commitment measure (see Table 10) • Not only 
should effort be correlated with the goal acceptance/goal 
commitment measures, but, because motivational force is 
hypothesized to be the determinant of goal commitment, 
effort should have also been positively correlated with MFS. 
As can be seen from Tables 9 and 10 MFS was significantly 
correlated with effort (p < .05). The results indicate 
mixed support for Hypothesis 6. 
Tests of the Linkage between Goals and Effort 
H7: If an individual's goal level increases, then 
effort will increase. 
Tables 11 and 12 contains the correlations among 
predicted goals, stated goals, assigned goals and effort for 
the two trials. According to the arguments presented in 
Chapter 2, the strongest correlation should be between the 
individual's stated goal and effort. The correlation 
between predicted goals and effort should be somewhat lower 
because of the additional error introduced by predicting 
(rather than directly measuring) the individual's goal. The 
correlation between assigned goals and effort should be the 
lowest of the three because goal assignment is hypothesized 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
91 
to affect effort only through its effect on individual 
goals. As can be seen from Tables 11 and 12, the only 
correlation not significant (p < .05) is between effort and 
assigned goals during Trial 1. Overall the results support 
Hypothesis 7. 
Tests of the Unified Model vs. Other Models. 
Hypotheses 8-13 were tested using hierarchical multiple 
regression analysis. Tables 13, 14, 15, and 16 present the 
result of these analysis. The column headed change in R2 is 
the increase in R2 resulting from the addition of that 
variable to the model. Significance levels for the increase 
in R2 were calculated according to Kerlinger, (1986). In 
each analysis ability (the subject's pre-test performance 
score) and sex were used as covariates. 
HS: Adding goal commitment to a model that 
contains an individual's goal (predicted on a 
within-subject basis using the expectancy choice 
model), will significantly improve the predictive 
ability of the model. 
Hypothesis 8 tests the unified model against the 
traditional goal choice model. Support for this hypothesis 
indicates support for the unified theory. Because of the 
high correlation among the three questionnaire measures of 
goal acceptance and goal commitment, only the first factor 
produced by the factor analysis (previously labeled goal 
acceptance) was used to test hypotheses involving goal 
acceptance or goal commitment. 
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The addition of goal acceptance did not improve the 
effort model in Trial 1 (see Table 13), but did 
significantly improve prediction in Trial 2 (see Table 14). 
The same results were obtained when performance was used as 
the dependent variable; addition of goal acceptance did not 
yield significant improvements in Trial 1 (see Table 15), 
but did yield significant improvements in Trial 2 (see 
Table 16). It may be that most subjects were highly 
committed to the assigned goal during the first trial, and 
that there was no significant variance in the degree of goal 
acceptance until the second trial when subjects were 
beginning to become tired of the exercise. During the first 
trial this was a novel, new game. By the second trial 
students were beginning to become physically tired, it was 
close to the end of the class, and they were ready to quit. 
As a result the intrinsic satisfaction, and therefore goal 
acceptance/goal commitment, should have been higher during 
the first trial than during the second trial. 
H9: Adding assigned goals to a model that 
contains goal commitment and an individual's goal 
will not improve the predictive ability of the 
model. 
Hypothesis 9 tests the unified model against the traditional 
goal setting model. Support of Hypothesis 9 supports the 
unified theory, rejection of Hypothesis 9 supports the 
traditional goal setting model. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 9 
Correlations between Acceptance, Commitment, MFS, & Effort 
Trial 1, n = 250 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. IG - AG 1.00 
2. Goal Accept. -.28** 1.00 
3. Pos. Com. -.08 .34** 1.00 
4. Neg. Com. .31** -.63** -.31** 1. 00 
5. MFS -.32** .28** .02 -.16* 1.00 
93 
6. Effort -.32** .17** -.01 -.01 .14* 1. 00 
* p < .05 
** = p < .01 
I.G. = individual's goal 
A.G. assigned goal 
Pos. Com. = postive goal commitment 
Neg. Com. = negative goal commitment 
MFS = motivational force score 
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Table 10 
correlations between Acceptance, commitment, MFS, & Effort 
Trial 2, n = 225 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
94 
------------------------------------------------------------
1. IG - AG 
2. Goal Accept. 
3. Pas. Corn. 
4. Neg. Corn. 
5. MFS 
6. Effort 
* < .05 







I.G. = individual's goal 
A.G. = assigned goal 
1.00 




Pas. Corn. = postive goal commitment 
Neg. Corn. = negative goal commitment 
MFS = motivational force score 
1.00 
-.26** 1. 00 
-.29** .21** 1. 00 
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Table 11 
correlation between Goals & Effort 
Trial 1, n = 250 
1 2 3 4 
-----------------------------------------------
1. Predicted Goal 1. 00 
2. Stated Goal .52** 1.00 
3. Assigned Goal .08 .22** 1.00 
4. Effort .23** .40** .08 1.00 
** p < .01 
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Table 12 
Correlation between Goals & Effort 
Trial 2, n = 250 
1 2 3 4 
----------------------------------------------
1. Predicted Goal 
2. Stated Goal 
3. Assigned 
4. Effort 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
Goal 
1. 00 
.45** 1. 00 
.12 .20** 1.00 
.19** .35** .15* 1. 00 
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Hypothesis 9 was supported in every instance except one; 
adding assigned goals to the effort model in Trial 1 
resulted in a significant increase in the predictive power 
of the model. 
HlO: Adding the motivational force of high 
performance to a model that contains an 
individual's goal and goal commitment will not 
significantly improve the model's predictive 
ability. 
97 
Hypothesis 10 tests the unified theory against the 
traditional expectancy force model. Support of this 
hypothesis supports the unified theory, rejection of this 
hypothesis supports the traditional force model. Hypothesis 
10 was supported in both trials for both the effort and 
performance models. 
Hll: Adding the slope of the utility curve to a 
model that contains an individual's goal and goal 
commitment will not significantly increase the 
model's predictive ability. 
Hypothesis 11 tests the unified theory against the 
alternative formulations which use slope (return on effort) 
(Kennedy et al., 1983; Kopelman, et al., 1978). The results 
support the unified model because the addition of slope was 
not significant in Trials 1 or 2 for either the effort or 
the performance model. 
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H12: Adding self-efficacy to a model which 
contains an individual's goal and goal commitment 
will not increase the model's predictive ability. 
H13: Adding summed valence to a model that 
contains an individual's goal and goal commitment 
will not increase the model's predictive ability. 
Hypothesis 12 tests the unified model against models 
98 
which use self-efficacy and Hypothesis 13 against models 
which use summed valence measures (i.e. Locke et al., 1986; 
Garland, 1985). The tests of Hypothesis 12 support the 
unified theory because the addition of neither self-efficacy 
nor summed valence resulted in a significant increase in R2 
for the effort or performance models during Trials 1 or 2. 
Overall, the hierarchical regression analysis supports 
the unified model with two exceptions. First, during Trial 
1 goal commitment did not significantly increase the 
explanatory power of the model, and assigned goals did 
increase the explanatory power of the model. This indicates 
that the assigned goal was having an effect on effort other 
than through its effect on individual goals or goal 
commitment, a result inconsistent with the unified model. 
In Trial 2, however, goal commitment did significantly 
improve the model and assigned goal did not significantly 
improve the model. It may be that motivational differences 
did not become apparent until the subjects were becoming 
tired. 
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Table 13 
Tests of the Unified Model Against other Models; 
Effort Regression Models-Trial 1 (n = 178) 





H9: assigned goal 
HlO: motivatinal force 
Hll: slope 
Hl2: summed valence 
Hl3: self-efficacy 
reward 
** p < .05 
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Table 14 
Tests of the unified Model Against other Models; 
Effort Regression Models-Trial 2 (n = 143) 












HlO: motivational force .23 
Hll: slope .23 
Hl2: summed valence .24 
Hl3: self-efficacy .23 
reward .30 
** p < .05 
*** p < .01 
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Table 15 
Tests of the Unified Model Aqainst other Models; 
Performance Reqression Models-Trial 1 (n = 166) 
----------------------------------------------------Rz Change in Rz .E 
----------------------------------------------------






H9: assigned goal 
HlO: motivational force 
Hll: slope 
H12: summed valence 
H13: self-efficacy 
reward 
** p < .05 
*** p < .01 
.47 24.19*** 
.40 .40 107.60*** 
.46 .06 18.94*** 
.47 .01 5.23** 
.47 .oo .oo 
.47 .oo .00 
.48 .01 .78 
.48 .01 .78 
.47 .oo .00 
.48 .01 .78 
.48 .01 .78 
.48 .01 .78 
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Table 16 
Tests of the Unified Model Aqainst other Models: 
Performance Reqression Models-Trial 2 (n = 143) 
----------------------------------------------------Rz Change in Rz E 
----------------------------------------------------






H9: assigned goal 
HlO: motivational force 
Hll: slope 
H12: summed valence 
Hl3: self-efficacy 
reward 
** p < .05 
*** p < .01 
.50 24.19*** 
.34 .34 74.18*** 
.43 .09 20.47*** 
.46 .03 9.33*** 
.49 .03 9.33*** 
.50 .01 2.12 
.50 .00 .oo 
.50 .oo .oo 
.51 .01 2.72 
.51 .01 2.72 
.50 .oo .oo 
.51 .01 2.72 
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In the performance models the addition of the 
individual's stated goal and goal commitment should not have 
been significant because the effect of goals and goal 
commitment should be on effort and effort was already in the 
model. This was true for Trial 1, but was not true for 
Trial 2. In Trial 2 goal commitment and individual goals 
were both significant predictors of performance. 
One could speculate that during the experiment subjects 
concluded that the primary determinant of performance was 
not the number of ringers tossed (the measure of effort used 
in this study), but concentration. If so, goal commitment 
and goal level may have been affecting other types of 
effort, such as mental concentration, not measured in this 
study. 
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Chapter s 
Conclusions 
Goal Assignment and Expectancies/Valences Linkage 
104 
This study was conducted, in part, because of the 
belief that the empirical success of goal setting 
researchers had led them dangerously close to assuming a 
direct relationship between assigned goals and performance. 
The danger in this line of reasoning is that it 
oversimplifies the task of performance motivation. If one 
believes individuals generally accept any type and level of 
performance goal, there is no need to be concerned with 
whether the assigned goal level is reasonable or not. In 
fact, one could conclude that the best policy would be to 
assign as difficult a goal as possible, even if it is 
unattainable (which is the conclusion reached by Garland, 
1983). Furthermore, there is no reason to be concerned with 
whether individuals find accomplishment of the assigned 
goals intrinsically or extrinsically satisfying. There is 
no reason to study reward systems or the motivational 
aspects of leadership. 
In contrast to the view that assigned goals are the 
primary explanation of differences in performance, the 
theory proposed in this study argues that motivational 
differences in performance are due to either 1) difference 
in individual goals, or 2) differences in the amount of 
effort individuals are willing to exert toward a goal. 
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It further proposes that the reason individuals have the 
performance goal is because they have chosen to attempt a 
particular goal level, and that the reason they have chosen 
to attempt that performance level, and not others, is 
because the consequences of attempting to perform at that 
performance goal level are more favorable than the 
consequences of performing at any other performance level. 
The theory also recognizes that individuals with the same 
goal may differ in the intensity or persistence of effort 
exerted to accomplish the goal because of differences in the 
magnitude of the expected value of goal accomplishment. 
If this theory is correct, assigning difficult goals 
may or may not increase performance. If the assigned goal 
level has a lower expected value than some other goal level 
then the individual should not accept the assigned goal. 
Even if the individual accepts the assigned goal, if the 
expected value of accomplishing the goal is low, motivation 
toward the goal should be low, the individual should not be 
very committed to the goal, and the individual should be 
unwilling to engage in difficult or prolonged effort to 
reach the goal. Assigned goals would be only one of many 
possible variables which could affect the value of reaching 
a given goal level, and the only time assigning goals should 
affect performance is when the act of assigning goals 
affects the expected value of performing at various levels. 
Because both the expectancy choice model and the 
expectancy force model rely on probabilities and valences to 
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determine expected value, the only way goal assignment could 
affect goal choice, or motivation toward a goal, would be to 
affect probability estimates or valences. The significant 
support for Hypothesis lA and Hypothesis lB provides 
evidence for the proposed linkage between goal assignment 
and expectancies/valences. Individuals perceived goals 
lower than the assigned goal to be less attractive than the 
assigned or higher goal levels. 
Although the analysis of the effect of goal assignment 
on valences leads one to conclude that assigning difficult 
goals has a positive effect by making high goal levels more 
attractive than lower goal levels, the affect of goal 
assignment on probabilities provides evidence that assigning 
difficult goals may also have negative effects. Subjects in 
the moderate goal condition systematically perceived their 
probability of achieving each of the various goal levels to 
be higher than did subjects in the hard goal level, the 
opposite of the hypothesized effect. The original 
hypothesis was based on Garland's (1985) reasoning that 
subjects assigned difficult goals would interpret the 
assignment as an indication that they were capable of 
achieving difficult goals and, therefore, would have higher 
probability estimates. What actually seems to be happening 
is that subjects are forming probability estimates based on 
the expected probability of achieving the assigned goal. If 
they do not believe it very likely they will be able to 
achieve the assigned goal, as happened in the hard goal 
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condition, they lose confidence not only in their ability to 
reach the.assigned goal but other goals as well; an overall 
decrease in self-confidence or self-efficacy. 
This does not necessarily mean that the decrease in 
self-confidence will result in lower effort or performance. 
If higher goal levels have higher valences than lower goal 
levels, the expected value of difficult goals may still be 
greater than the expected value of lower goal levels. If 
so, even though the probability of success is lower, the 
individual would still choose the higher goal and would 
exert more effort. In this study, for example, even though 
subjects in the hard goal condition had lower probabilities, 
they still had a mean individual goal of 7.5 points 
(s.d. = 2.9) compared to the moderate goal group's mean 
individual goal of 6.58 points (s.d. = 2.5). 
It does mean, however, that subjects in the hard goal 
condition would have lower motivational force scores and 
would be less committed to achieving the goal. If the 
inability to achieve an assigned goal does result in an 
overall decrease in self-efficacy, self-confidence, or self-
esteem further longitudinal studies are needed before 
implementing Garland's (1985) recommendation that impossible 
goals be assigned. 
The evidence this study provides that goal assignment 
has it effect, and is moderated by, probabilities and 
valences, is important because it supports the belief that 
goal acceptance and goal commitment should not be taken for 
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granted, but should be studied as important motivational 
constructs. While it provides some evidence as to how goal 
assignment affects motivation, many important questions 
remain to be answered by future research. When do assigned 
goals improve performance and when do they not? Is it 
possible that some assigned goals actually hurt performance? 
If so, under what conditions? How and why does goal 
assignment affect the probabilities and valences? Are some 
people who assign goals better at getting goal acceptance 
and goal commitment than others? If so, what do they do 
different? 
Linkage between Expected Value and Goal Choice 
The next step in the causal chain proposed by the 
unified model is that expectancies and valences should 
affect effort through their effect on goal choice and 
motivational force. Even though the correlation is only .52 
or .45 between predicted goals and stated goals, it should 
be noted that the correlation between the individuals stated 
goal and effort was only .40. It does raise questions about 
why an individual would indicate that they find goal A more 
attractive than goal B, but then choose goal B. One 
possibility is that when subjects are asked the 
attractiveness of a performance goal, the reported 
attractiveness does not reflect the positive or negative 
value of the effort level required to achieve the goal. If 
so, a model such as Evan's might produce higher 
correlations. Nevertheless, it does support the belief that 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
109 
individuals choose the performance level they will attempt, 
and that, if one knows something about the perceived 
consequences or expected value the individual associates 
with various goal levels it is possible to predict the goal 
they will choose. If one wants individuals to choose high 
performance goals, then the expected payoff for high 
performance has to be higher than the expected payoff for 
lo~ performance. In terms of management practice, managers 
should try to persuade those they manage that performing at 
a high level is more intrinsically satisfying than 
performing at lower levels. Formal evaluation and reward 
systems should be designed in ways that reward high 
performance more than low performance. 
While it is clear that high performance should be more 
rewarding than low performance it is not clear exactly how 
this condition should be created. One strategy would be to 
assign very difficult goals, tell people it is acceptable to 
try and fail, reward goal accomplishment, and ignore goal 
failure. On the other hand, another way to create a 
difference between high and low goals would be to assign a 
difficult goal, then punish people for performing at levels 
lower than the assigned levels. All three types of 
strategies are observed in practice, but expectancy theory 
makes no predictions as to which of the three strategies is 
better than the others, and, there have been no attempt to 
determine empirically which strategy is most effective. 
Consequently, further research is needed in this area. 
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Linkage between Expected Value, Goal Acceptance and Goal 
Commitment 
110 
Tests of the correlation between the expected value of 
the individual's goal, various goal commitment/acceptance 
measures, and effort were generally significant. Because of 
the problems with the goal commitment/goal acceptance 
measures, if a distinction is to be made between goal 
acceptance and goal commitment, goal commitment (like 
expected value) is going to have to be measured with respect 
to a specific referent. Instead of asking individuals how 
committed they are, the better approach would be to ask how 
committed they are to a specific goal level. 
Perhaps the most important contribution of this study 
was the theoretical and empirical distinction between effort 
variance attributable to goal variance, and the effort 
variance within a goal group attributable to variation in 
the motivational force toward the goal. While motivation 
theorist have recognized the importance of creating payoff 
differentials between high and low performance for some 
time, and subsequently have developed pay systems such as 
bonus pay systems or piece-rate systems, the implications of 
a "magnitude effect" does not seem to have received 
sufficient attention. rt may be that when differential pay 
systems don't work, one of the major reasons is that even 
though there is a pay differential. between high and low 
performance, the magnitude of the expected payoff is so low, 
that the motivational force is too weak to have a 
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significant impact on effort and performance. It is not 
uncommon to hear of piece-rate systems, particularly, that 
do not work. In some cases workers find it more attractive 
to work at the minimum wage rate than to attempt the higher 
performance levels required to benefit from the piece rate. 
It may be that the piece rate is so low, the workers are not 
motivated by it. 
The relationship between goal acceptance/goal 
commitment and effort was stronger in the second trial than 
in the first trial. By the time the students participated 
in the second trial they were physically tired, it was the 
end of the class period, and they were ready to quit. As a 
result, differences in goal commitment were more pronounced 
during the second trial. This illustrates the importance of 
recognizing that motivation is a multidimensional construct 
involving not only direction and intensity, but persistence 
as well. In this case, by the time of the second trial many 
of the students were no longer willing to exert effort. If 
only one trial had been conducted, the persistance effect 
would not have been detected. It also indicates a possible 
problem with relying exclusively on goal assignment to 
motivate people. While assigning goals may be one way of 
initiating action, other types of motivation techniques, 
such as extrinsic rewards, may be necessary to sustain 
action. 
While extrinsic rewards are important determinate of 
goal commitment and goal acceptance, investigating the way 
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in which intrinsic motivation can be used to increase goal 
acceptance/goal commitment seems to be an important area for 
future research. If the act of assigning goals is enough to 
change peoples intrinsic satisfaction with reaching certain 
goals, it may be that other managerial actions, such as 
persuading people of the value of accomplishing a certain 
goal level, are also able to produce substantial changes in 
intrinsic satisfaction. In fact, it may be that the ability 
to change individuals intrinsic satisfaction with performing 
at various levels is one of the primary attributes of what 
is sometimes called "charismatic leadership." 
Linkage between Goals and Effort 
As is the case in most goal setting studies, a 
significant correlation was obtained between assigned goals 
and effort. It is interesting to note that in this study 
the strongest correlation was between the individual's 
stated goal and effort, and the correlation between the 
predicted goal and effort was stronger than the correlation 
between the assigned goal and effort. One other point is 
that while low correlations between predicted goals and 
effort are sometimes cited as an indication of problems with 
expectancy type models, the correlations between stated 
goals (both stated effort goals and stated performance 
goals) and effort were not very high either. The fact that 
the correlations were low, however, does not necessarily 
indicate a problem with the theory. It may be that 
individuals with higher goals were trying harder along some 
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dimension not measured as effort in this study. In this 
study effort was measured as the distance traveled during 
the trial, but some individuals may not have tried hard by 
running faster, but by running slower and concentrating 
longer on each toss. 
The Unified Model vs. Other Models 
In general the results supported the unified model. 
The unified theory was consistently highly significant in 
the predicted direction. Also, the marginal E test 
indicated that the addition of the unified model constructs 
was significant even when variables from other models (such 
as assigned goals) were already in the model. However, 
constructs from other models were not significant when they 
were added to the unified model. One exception was the 
addition of assigned goals in Trial 1. In Trial 1 the 
marginal test of goal commitment was not significant, but 
the marginal test of assigned goals was significant. In 
Trial 2 the exact opposite occurred. The most reasonable 
explanation seems to be that, as was discussed earlier, 
motivational force (or commitment) did not become important 
until subjects began to tire somewhat. 
Another interesting conclusion is that sex was the most 
significant variable. On average females traveled 716 ft. 
during the two minute period (s.d. = 82 ft.) while men 
traveled 871 ft. (s.d. = 104 ft.). Even when ability 
differences were accounted for (by using pretest performance 
as a covariate) men exerted more effort than women. A 
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review of the probabilities, valences, and goal commitment 
measurements did not indicate any significant difference 
between men and women. It may be that there were ability 
differences which the ability measure used here did not 
adequately capture, or there may differences in the way men 
and women react to goal assignment. The data do not allow a 
clear answer, but it would seem to be a promising area for 
future research. It may be that the act of assigning 
difficult goals affects women differently than men. At the 
moment there is no theory which would explain how or why 
that would be true. 
Finally, in spite of the fact that both effort and 
ability were already in the model, in Trial 2 the addition 
of various measures such as goal commitment and goal valence 
were still significant. The most logical explanation would 
seem to be that motivation was affecting concentration, not 
just effort. 
Contributions and Limitations 
The major premise of this study was that the goal-
setting, goal-choice, and goal-force models were not 
contradictory, but complementary. In general, this 
conclusion seems to be supported. The results indicate that 
not only does high performance have to be more attractive 
than low performance, the magnitude of the expected value of 
high performance has an independent effect on motivation and 
performance. 
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Also, the study makes a methodological contribution by 
clarifying the relationship between goal acceptance and goal 
commitment, and by providing a technique for using a between 
subjects design for testing expectancy theory models. 
At the same time several caveats are in order. The 
first is that the subjects in the sample were college 
students. Even though most of the students worked at least 
part time, it is not clear that student behavior on two 
minute trials will generalize to other populations. The 
generalizability of laboratory studies that use students has 
been questior.ed in some areas of research, and it has been 
suggested that researchers should be required to demonstrate 
that in his or her area of research the results obtained in 
the laboratory using students are generalizable (Gordon, 
Slade, & Schmitt, 1986). Latham & Lee (1985), after 
comparing field and laboratory studies of goal setting (most 
of which used students and game-like tasks), concluded that 
in goal setting research laboratory studies that use 
students are generalizable, validating the use of lab 
studies and students in this area of research. Despite a 
call for laboratory tests of expectancy theory (i.e. Daehler 
& Mobley, 1973), most expectancy theory studies have been 
field studies, and it is not clear if lab studies will 
generalize or not. 
Another reason the generalizability of the study might 
be questioned is the use of a "game" instead of a "work" 
type task. The use of games to test organizational behavior 
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theories has a long and varied tradition (Weick, 1965). 
While games may appear to be artificial and lack the realism 
of a work task, what may be more important than realism is 
what Zelditch & Evan (1962) have called the "rule of 
genotypic similarity." This rule states that "the 
properties of a simulate need not look like the properties 
they represent; what is required is that they obey the same 
laws" (Weick, 1965). In a similar vein, Zigler (1963) 
concludes that tests of a theory seldom require a natural-
appearing situation. He reasons that if the principles 
contained in a theory are relevant to one world (such as the 
workplace) they should be relevant to other worlds (such as 
laboratories) as well. The critical question is not the 
correspondence between the appearance of the lab task and 
the appearance of real world task, but the correspondence 
between the task and the theory (Weick, 1965) . Differences 
between real world subjects and laboratory subjects, or 
between real world tasks and laboratory tasks are not 
important unless one has some reason to believe that some 
specific attribute of the subject or some attribute of the 
task systematically correlate with the effect being studied 
(Zelditch & Evan, 1962; Weick, 1967). Finally, while it is 
probably true that the use of students and games limits the 
external validity or generalizability of a study, almost any 
task, whether a game or not, can be criticized on the same 
basis. A simple clerical task may bear little resemblance 
to most managerial or professional tasks. 
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While the results were encouraging, important problems 
remain. It is still not clear how difficult a goal 
individuals should be assigned or encouraged to set. ·Also, 
better between subjects valence measures are needed. Even 
though there were significant differences in effort between 
the reward and no-reward conditions, there were no 
statistically significant differences in reported 
attractiveness of goals. One conclusion is that the 
subjects were using different anchors when responding to the 
question. Also, the A, not A measures did not work. 
Subjects did not know what "not A" was. Does "not A" refer 
to goals higher than the assigned goal, or lower than the 
assigned goal, or both? A possible solution is to change 
the question so it asks about the valence of performing at 
goal level "i" or higher, and the valence of performing at 
goal level "i" or lower. 
Finally, it is not clear what the precise formulation 
is for predicting goal valence. Many different equations 
have been proposed under the label "expectancy theory," and 
it is not clear which formulation, if any, actually captures 
the valences used by subjects when making performance 
decisions. 
In terms of the implications for managers, it seems 
clear that both goal level and goal commitment are 
important. If it is possible to get significant variance in 
effort toward a goal using a game, college students, and two 
minute trials, the variance among employees is probably much 
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higher. The basic recommendation would be to make high 
performance more attractive than low performance, and to 
make the magnitude of the attractiveness large enough to 
gain goal commitment. 
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Even so, several important questions remain. One is, 
"When it comes to rewards, how large is large enough?" 
Another is, "How difficult is difficult enough, and how 
difficult is too difficult?" In this study, as in most 
studies, the subjects performed better when difficult goals 
were assigned, even though the objective probability of 
achieving the assigned goal was very low. Nevertheless, it 
seems unwise to recommend that managers assign unachievable 
goals at this time. In lab studies the consequences of not 
achieving a goal are not very substantial. In real work 
situations the consequences for not achieving a goal are 
often very substantial. It may well be that this results in 
a very different reaction to the assignment of difficult 
goals. 
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RING-TOSS QUESTIONNAIRE 
s. s .1; _______ _ 
PLEASE ANSWER EACH OF THE QUESTIONS BELOW BY MARKING THE NUMBER OR LETTER / 
Of THE DESCRIPTION WHICH BEST FITS YOU OR BY WRITING IN THE CORRECT ANSWER./ 
l. What goal were you assigned for 2. What is your personal goal 
the next period? for the next period? 
a. To score 1 or 2 points 
a. To score 4 points b. To score 2 or 3 points 
b. To score 6 points c. To score 4 or 5 points 
c. To score 9 points d. To score 6 or 7 points 
. d. To score 11 points e. To score 8 or 9 points 
e. Something else f. To score 10 or 11 points 
g. To score more than 11 points 
h. To do your best 
i. Something else 
2. How would you describe this game? 
Unpleasant 0-----1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7 Pleasant 
Dull 0-----1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7 Exciting 
Significant 0-----1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7 Pointless 
Challenging 0-----1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7 Trivial 
Boring 0-----1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7 Interesting 
Satisfying 0-----1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7 Unsatisfying 
Tedious 0-----1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7 Fun 












5. Acceptance of a goal means assuming the assigned goal as your own personal 
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6. Commitment to a goal means the determination and persistence to achieve a 




neutral not at all 
committed 













neutral not at all d:-termi:1c-d 
9. Of the maximum effort (100%) you could exert in pursuit of your goal, 
what percentage do you think you will exert? 
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10-----11-----12 
0% 50% 100% 
10. How difficult to you think it will be to achieve the performance goal 
















12. To what extent do you honestly accept the performance goal determined 








13. How satisfied were you with your performance during the last period? 
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10-----11-----12 
very satisfied neutral very dissatisfieJ 
2 
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14. How interesting is this game? 15. How difficult is this game? 
[ l I very interesting [ l] very difficult 
(2 I somewhat interesting (2] somewhat difficult 
[ 3 I average (3] average 
(4] somewhat uninteresting (4] somewhat easy 
[ 5 J very uninteresting [ s I very easy 
16. How challenging do you find 17. How enjoyable do you find 
this game? this game? 
[ lJ very challenging [ l] very enjoyable 
(2 J somewhat challenging [2 J somewhat enjoyable 
(3 I average [ 3 J average 
(4] somewhat unchallenging [4] somewhat unenjoyable 
[ 5 J very unchallenging Is I very unenjoyable 
3 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I INDICATE THE EXTENT TO tJHICH YOU AGREE OR I 
I DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS I 




0 ... ... 
"' 






" >-. " ... 
~ 00 ~ 
0 "' 
l. I am strongly committed co pursuing my goal in this game ..... [l] [2] [3) .. 
4. There's not much co be gained by trying to achieve chis goal.[l] [2! :3; .. 
2. I am willing co put forth a great deal of effort beyond 
what I would normally do to achieve this goal ............. ... [lJ [2] [3J ·~· 
5. It is quite possible chat this goal needs to be changed ...... [l] [2] [3] .. 
3. Quite frankly, I don't care if I achieve this goal or noc .... [l] [2] [3! '.4'. 
7. It's unrealistic for me co expect to reach this goal. ........ [l] [2] '.3] .. 
6. It wouldn't take long for me Co abandon this goal ............ [l] [2] :3J .. . 
8. Since it's hard co tell how hard a goal is until you've 
played a game for awhile, it's hard for me co cake 
chis goal seriously .......................................... [ l J [ 2) [ 3] [ 4: 
9. I think chis goal is a good goal to shoot for ................ [l] [2] [3] [4; 
10. Performance on this game is primarily due co luck ........... [lJ (2) [3] ~4! 
11. Performance on this game is primarily due co effort ......... [ll (2] [3! [4] 
12. Performance on this game is primarily due co the diffi· 
culcy of the game ............................... · ............ [ l] [ 2 J ~ 3 1 ... ; 
13. Performance on this game is primarily due Co ability ........ [l] [ 2 J [ 3 ! [~; 
14. Accomplishing this goal will give me a sense of achievement. [l] (2 J [ 3] (4] 
4 
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Subjective probabilities are numbers which indicate how likely 
it is that an event will occur. A probability can be any number 
between 0 and 1. If the probability is 0, there is no possibility 
that the event will occur. If the probability is l, the event is 
certain to occur. For example, if you flip a coin, the probability 
of getting a head is 0.5 
15. If you walk slowly during the next 
period, what is the probability 
that you will score: 
16. If you walk at a normal pace, 
what is the probability that 
you will score: 
less than 2 points 
2 or 3 points 
4 or 5 points 
6 or 7 points 
8 or 9 points 
10 or 11 points 








17. If you jog what is the probability 
that you will score: 
less than 2 points 
2 or 3 points 
4 or 5 points 
6 or 7 points 
8 or 9 points 
10 or 11 points 








less than 2 points 
2 or 3 points 
4 or 5 points 
6 or 7 points 
8 or 9 points 
10 or 11 points 








18. If you run what is the proba-
bility that you will score: 
less than 2 points 
2 or 3 points 
4 or 5 points 
6 or 7 points 
8 or 9 points 
10 or 11 points 








extremely somewhat somewhat extremely 
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19. How attractive do you 
find the idea of: 
attractive attractive unattractive unattractive 
a. walking slowly [ l] [ 2] [31 [4] 
b. walking normally [l] [ 2] [3] [4] 
c. jogging [ l] [ 21 [ 3 I [4] 
d. running [ l] [ 2 I [ 31 (4] 
e. scoring < 2 points [ l] [ 2 I [ 3] [4] 
f. scoring 2 or 3 points [ l] [ 2] [ 3] [4] 
g. scoring 4 or 5 points [l] [ 2] [ 3] [4] 
h. scoring 6 or 7 points [ l] [ 2] (31 [4] 
i. scoring 8 or 9 points [ l] [ 2] [3] [4] 
j. scoring 10 or 11 points [ l] [ 2] [ 31 (4] 
k. scoring more than 11 [ l] [ 2 I [ 3] (4] 
5 
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extremely somewhat somewhat extremely 
20. How satisfied will you satisfied satisfied dissatisfied 
dissatisfied 
be if you: 
a. score < 2 points [l] [2] [ 31 [4] 
b. do not score < 2 points [ 11 [2] [ 31 [4] 
c. score 2 or 3 points [ l] [2] [ 31 [4] 
d. do not score 2 or 3 points [l] [2] l 3 I [4] 
e. score 4 or 5 points [ l] [ 2] [ 3 I [4] 
f. do not score 4 or 5 points [ l] [2] [ 3 I [4] 
g. score 6 or 7 points [ lJ [2] [ 3 I [4 I 
h. do not score 6 or 7 points [lJ [2] l 3 J [4] 
i. score 8 or 9 points [l] [2] [31 [4] 
j . do not score 8 or 9 points [ l] [2] [ 3 I [4] 
k. score 10 or 11 points [l] [2] [ 31 [4] 
1. do not score 10 or 11 points [l 1 [2] [3 I [4] 
m. score more than 11 [ l] [2] [3] [4! 
n. do not score more than 11 [l] [ 2] [ 3 I [4] 
21. If you try to score 2 or less points, what is the probability that you: 
a. will score < 2 points __ prob. 
b. will not score < 2 points __ prob. 
22. If you try to score 2 or 3 points, what is the probability that you: 
a. will score 2 or 3 points __ prob. 
b. will not score 2 or 3 points __ prob. 
23. If you try to score 4 or 5 points, what is the probability that you: 
a. will score 4 or 5 points __ prob. 
b. will not score 4 or 5 points __ prob. 
24: If you try to score 6 or 7 points, what is the probability that you: 
a. will score 6 or 7 points __ prob. 
b. will not score 6 or 7 points __ prob. 
25. If you try to score 8 or 9 points, what is the probability that you: 
a. will score 8 or 9 points __ prob. 
b. will not score 8 or 9 points __ prob. 
26. If you try to score 10 or 11 points, what is the probability that you: 
a. will score 10 or ll points __ prob. 
b. will not score 10 or ll points __ prob. 
27. If you try to score more than 11 points, what is the probability that you: 
a. will score more than ll points __ prob. 
b. will not score more than 11 points __ prob. 
6 
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somewhat somewhat extremely 
28. How satisfied will you 
if you score: 
extremely 
satisfied satisfied dissatisfied dissatisfied 
a. 1 or more points 
b. 2 or more points 
c. 3 or more points 
d. 4 or more points 
e. 5 or more points 
f. 6 or more points 
g. 7 or more points 
h. 8 or more points 
i. 9 or more points 
j. 10 or more points 












29. What is the probability of scoring: 
a. 1 or more points 
b. 2 or more points 
c. 3 or more points 
d. 4 or more points 
e. 5 or more points 
f. 6 or more points 
g. 7 or more points 
h. 8 or more points 
i. 9 or more points 
m. 10 or more points 












[2] (3) (4] 
[2) [ 3 J [4] 
[2] [3] (4] 
[2] (3] [41 
(2 J [ 3 J [ 4] 
[2] [3] (4] 
[2] (3] (4] 
[2] [3] [41 
[2] (3] [41 
[2 J [ 3 J [4 J 
[2 J [ 3 J [ 4 J 










31. How many points do you 
intend to score? 
___ points. 
32. How hard do you think your friends will work? 
[l] run [2] jog (3) walk normally [4] walk slowly 
33. How many points do you think your friends will try to score? 
34. How hard will your friends think you should work? 
(l] run [2] jog [3] walk normally (4] walk slowly 
35. How many points will your friends think you should 
try to score? __ points. 
36. Would you like to play this game again? [l] yes [2] no 
37. If this game were for sale would you buy it? (l] yes [2] no 
38. If your answer to question 37 was yes, how much would you be 
willing to pay for it? dollars. 
points. 
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39. What was the primary determinate of how 
well you performed during the last period? 
[lJ Your own skill 
[2] Luck 
[3] Your knowledge of the game 
[4] The strategy you used 
[S] The amount of effort exerted 
[6J The difficulty of the game 
[7J Uncontrollable chance factors 
[SJ Your ability 
40. If you played this game again, do you 
think your performance would: 
[lJ Improve greatly 
[2] Improve somewhat 
[3] Stay the same 
[4] Be somewhat worse 
[SJ Be a lot worse 
41. How attractive is the coupon prize?* 
[lJ Highly attractive 
[2] Attractive 
[3J Somewhat attractive 
[4] Neither attractive nor unattractive 
[SJ Somewhat unattractive 
[6] Unattractive 
[7] Highly unattractive 
42. How much would you pay for one package of coupons?* ~~~~-dollars. 
* Questions 41 and 42 were included only in the reward condition. 
8 
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ABSTRACT 
Different individuals, with the same ability and faced with 
the same environmental constraints, exert varying amounts of 
effort, and, to the extent that performance is a function of 
effort, achieve different levels of performance. This study 
proposes and tests a theory of motivation which is an integration 
of what have previously been considered separate, and often 
conflicting, theories of motivation. The study hypothesizes that 
motivational differences in effort or performance may be due to 
either differences in goal level or differences in goal 
commitment and tests the integrated model against a model which 
uses assigned goals to predict effort (goal setting theory), a 
model which uses the expected value of goals to predict goal 
choice, then uses goal choice to predict effort (expectancy 
theory choice model), and a model which uses the expected value 
of a goal to predict effort (expectancy theory motivational force 
model). 
Two hundred fifty college students enrolled at Western 
Michigan University participated in a laboratory experiment using 
a 2x2x2 factorial design. The assigned goal level, the 
probability of success, and the valence of the outcomes of a 
ring-toss task were manipulated to assess their impact on effort 
and performance over two trials. 
Results generally support the unified model. Both 
individual goals and goal commitment were significant predictors 
1 
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of effort and performance, however goal commitment did not become 
significant until Trial 2. Apparently there was no difference in 
goal commitment until subjects began to tire. The results also 
show that goal assignment affects both probability and valence 
estimates. Also, predicted goals were significantly correlated 
with stated goals. Tests against alternative formulations 
demonstrated that the unified model was superior to the goal 
setting model, the expectancy choice model, and the expectancy 
force model. 
The results of the study imply that the higher the 
individual's goal, the higher the performance, individuals will 
choose higher goals as long as higher goals have higher expected 
value than less difficult goals, and the higher the expected 
value of a goal the more committed an individual will be to the 
goal. Implications of the results for managers are discussed. 
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